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Three Essays on the Economics of Education
Mariesa Ann Herrmann
This dissertation consists of essays on three inputs into the educational production func-
tion: curriculum, peers, and teachers. The chapters are linked by their focus on understand-
ing the importance of these inputs for student achievement and by their exploitation of the
exact timing of events (i.e., student mobility, receipt of special education services, teacher
absences) to identify causal effects.
The first chapter examines how decentralized decision-making about schools’ curricula af-
fects student achievement. Decentralized decision-making in this context involves a tradeoff,
since individual schools might be better able to target the needs of their student populations,
but their choices might not be aligned with the goals of the larger community. Differences
in curricula may also harm the achievement of mobile students, who have to adjust to new
curricula when they change schools.
My analysis is based on quasi-experimental variation from New York City, which stan-
dardized math and reading curricula starting in Fall 2003. Schools received exemptions from
the standardized curricula based on test score cutoffs, allowing me to use a regression dis-
continuity design to evaluate the causal effect of the policy change. I find that curriculum
standardization has no significant effect on student achievement, either overall or for mobile
students.
I also assess the extent to which curriculum standardization could benefit mobile students
using a novel test that exploits the timing of student mobility relative to the achievement
exam: I compare the achievement losses of students who could have been affected by having
to change curricula — those who changed schools before the exam — to those of students
who may have similar personal circumstances but whose achievement could not have been
affected by changing curricula — those who changed schools after the exam. The achievement
losses of these groups of students are similar, suggesting that omitted variables associated
with student mobility may explain the entirety of the mobility achievement gap and that
curriculum standardization may have little scope to improve the achievement of mobile
students.
The second chapter examines the effects of disabled peers on student achievement and
behavioral outcomes. Although disabled students might be expected to have negative effects
on their peers, this expectation has not been borne out in studies that focus on the peer
effects of special education students. This chapter argues that this is likely because special
education ameliorates negative peer effects.
To illustrate this argument, I exploit the longitudinal nature of the data to classify
students into categories based on when they received special education services. I classify
students who are ever observed in special education as “disabled” and those who currently
receive special education services as “special education” students. Students who enter special
education in the future are classified as having “undiagnosed disabilities,” while those who
exit special education have “declassified disabilities.” I then use school-grade variation in
the proportions of disabled peers to estimate their effects on non-disabled students.
Consistent with special education mitigating peer effects, I find that students with undi-
agnosed disabilities have significant negative effects on their non-disabled peers, but students
who are receiving special education services do not. Students who have been declassified also
have no effects on their peers, probably because they are positively selected among disabled
students. I also find that segregation is the likely mechanism by which special education
mitigates negative peer effects.
The third chapter, which is joint work with Jonah Rockoff and is forthcoming in the
Journal of Labor Economics, examines the effect of teacher absence on student achievement.
To address potential sources of bias from the endogeneity of teacher absence, we use detailed
data on the timing, duration, and cause of absences. Our main specification uses within
teacher variation, and in support of a causal interpretation, we show that teacher absences
before the exam have a significant negative effect on achievement while absences after the
exam do not.
Our estimates suggest that the daily loss associated with one absence is 0.001 standard
deviations in math and 0.0006 standard deviations in reading, the same as replacing an
average teacher with one at the 10-20th percentile of teacher value-added. We also find
evidence that the daily losses associated with an absence decline with the length of the
absence spell, consistent with long-term substitutes being of higher quality or learning on
the job.
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Economists have long debated the merits of decentralized decision-making in organizations.
The arguments for decentralization center on better information and adaptability to local
conditions, while the arguments against emphasize the need for coordination and greater
economies of scale. These tradeoffs have been the focus of a large theoretical literature
in organizational economics (e.g., Dessein 2002, Acemoglu et al. 2007), and a growing
number of empirical studies have examined the relationship between decentralization and
firms’ productivity (Janod and Saint-Martin 2004), labor skill mix (Caroli and Van Reenen
2001), and product variety (Thomas 2011).
These tradeoffs have also recently been highlighted in education in a growing debate over
the decentralization of curricular decisions in American public schools. The U.S. does not
currently have a national curriculum. This stands in contrast to many countries, many of
which (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Finland), outperform the U.S. on international measures of
student achievement (TIMSS 2008). Partly motivated by this evidence, the National Gov-
ernors Association and the Council of Chief State School Officers sponsored the creation of
new, national guidelines for the knowledge and skills expected of students from kindergarten
through grade 12 in mathematics and English. Released in June 2010, these Common Core
State Standards have been adopted in nearly all of the 50 states, and the U.S. Department
of Education is spending $360 million to develop assessments and curricular supports for the
“Common Core,” as it has come to be known. However, this shift towards national stan-
dards has prompted concerns that the U.S. is moving towards adopting a “one-size-fits-all,
centrally controlled curriculum” (“Closing the Door on Innovation” 2011).
Whether the adoption of a nationally standardized curriculum would improve student
achievement in the U.S. is theoretically ambiguous. Curriculum standardization may prevent
schools from choosing curricula that are better aligned with the needs of their particular
3student populations but may align instruction with the priorities of the larger community.
In addition, standardization may benefit mobile students, who may have difficulty adjusting
to different curricula when they change schools. These benefits could be considerable since
students who change schools already tend to suffer numerous educational disadvantages.1
Understanding how centralizing curricular decision-making affects student achievement
is important not only for informing debates over a national curriculum but also because
curriculum standardization has been at the heart of a number of recent educational reforms.
Many large, urban school districts (e.g., Chicago, New York City, Los Angeles, and Houston)
have already implemented district-wide standardized curricula, but there has not yet been
any empirical study of how this affects student achievement.
In this paper, I examine how the use of a standardized curriculum affects overall achieve-
ment, and, in particular, the achievement of mobile students. I base my analysis on quasi-
experimental variation caused by curricular reforms in New York City, which began imple-
menting standardized math and reading curricula in all but a set of exempt schools in fall
2004. Exemptions from the standardized curricula were primarily based on whether schools’
test scores met or exceeded certain thresholds, allowing me to estimate the causal effect of
curriculum standardization on achievement using a regression discontinuity design. Schools
that barely missed the exemption cutoff had to implement the standardized curricula, and
schools that barely made the threshold did not, thus providing a comparison of students in
schools that used different curricula but were otherwise similar.
I find that curriculum standardization has no significant effect on student achievement.
“Intent-to-treat” estimates indicate that falling below the cutoff and being mandated to
1A 1994 GAO report found that around 16% of 3rd graders had attended at least three different schools
since 1st grade, and data from the 1998 National Assessment of Educational Progress found that 34% of 4th
graders, 21% of 8th graders, and 10% of 12th graders had changed schools at least once in the previous year
(National Research Council and Institute of Medicine 2010). Mobile students are disproportionately likely
to be black or Hispanic and receive free lunch (Hanushek et al. 2004).
4adopt the standardized curricula results in statistically insignificant test score changes of
-0.004 standard deviations in math and -0.007 standard deviations in reading. The 2SLS
estimates are somewhat imprecise but rule out, at a 95% confidence level, effects below -
0.22 standard deviations in math and -0.26 standard deviations in reading and effects above
0.17 standard deviations in math and 0.22 standard deviations in reading, the type of large
improvements found in some prior studies of curricula.
I also find no evidence that standardization improved the achievement of mobile students.
In addition to the quasi-experimental variation caused by the reforms, I use a novel test
to assess how much of the mobility achievement gap could be causally related to changing
schools — comparing the achievement of students who move before the exam (or school year)
to those who move after the exam (or school year). Since any declines in the achievement of
students who move after the exam (or school year) cannot be causally related to changing
schools, these declines likely provide a lower bound on the amount of the achievement gap
that can be attributed to unobservable factors that tend to be correlated with student
mobility (e.g. parents’ job loss, divorce, etc.).2 Results from this test suggest that negative
selection could explain the entire achievement gap between mobile and non-mobile students,
suggesting that decentralization of curricular decisions has little role to play in explaining
low achievement among mobile students.
This paper continues as follows. Section 1.2 presents the conceptual framework, and
Section 1.3 discusses the institutional background. Section 1.4 describes the data, Section 1.5
presents the estimation strategy, and Section 1.6 reports the results. Section 1.7 concludes.
2This assumes that students who move after the exam (or school year) are less negatively selected than
students who move before the exam (or school year). This assumption is supported by results for selection
on observable characteristics; it is more difficult to say whether this is true for unobservable characteristics.
51.2 Conceptual Framework
The potential effects of curriculum standardization on student achievement can be illustrated
using a simple model in which achievement is produced from a combination of student, family,
and school inputs. In the model, schools are assumed to have chosen curriculum optimally
given their objective functions, which might maximize students’ expected achievement or
might focus on other outcomes altogether.3 The notion that schools may have objectives
other than maximizing student test scores is one rationale for school accountability reforms.
Since the effectiveness of a particular curriculum may vary across students, schools may
choose different curricula either because they have different student populations or different
objective functions.4 Moreover, schools may be discouraged from coordinating their curric-
ular decisions by high costs of communication. These differences in curricula may disrupt
the continuity of instruction for students who change schools, harming their achievement.
The fundamental assumption of the model is that students’ decisions to change schools
are exogenous to schools’ choices of curricula. This assumption seems reasonable to the
extent that moves happen for reasons that are likely unrelated to children’s schooling, and
parents would have to spend considerable time and effort to collect the curricula-related
information needed to inform these decisions.5
3Schools may assign different weights to the achievement of different groups of students; for example,
they may assign higher weights to students at the margin of passing the standardized exams.
4The effectiveness of various curricula for different groups of students is the subject of a large observational
and experimental literature, but many of these studies suffer from methodological problems. Many cross-
sectional studies compare schools that endogenously chose different curricula, and randomized control trials
often include only one teacher in the treatment or control group, possibly confounding curriculum with
teaching quality. While a complete discussion of this literature is outside the scope of this paper, I refer
the interested reader to the U.S. Department of Education’s What Works Clearinghouse (WWC), which
assesses research on various curricula (see http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/), and to the reports of the National
Mathematics Advisory Panel (2008) and National Reading Panel (2000). The latter reports primarily focus
on effective teaching practices (e.g., teacher-directed vs. student-centered math instruction, the importance
of phonemic awareness and phonics for reading instruction) but also provide some discussion of curriculum
materials related to these approaches.
5According to the CPS, 26% of within county moves are for family-related related reasons, 6% are for
6Consider a simple linear representation of the student achievement function:
Aist = Xit[α + β(cst)] +Mitλit + it (1.1)
where Aist is the achievement of student i who attends school s at the time of the exam
in year t. Achievement depends on student and family characteristics Xit and the school’s
curriculum cst, which affects achievement through its interaction with student characteristics,
i.e., β(cst). Achievement also depends on student mobility, which is represented by Mit, an
indicator for whether the student moved to school s from a different school. it represents
all other factors that affect student achievement.
λit is a coefficient that measures the effect of changing schools on achievement, and while
it could be positive, research generally supports the notion that it is negative on average. For
instance, a meta-analysis of 16 studies by Reynolds et al. (2009) finds that student mobility
is significantly associated with lower achievement and dropping out. However, it is unclear
whether these estimates should be interpreted causally since they may be confounded by
factors that tend to be correlated with changing schools (e.g., parents’ job loss, divorce,
eviction). Nonetheless, a number of studies that include controls for prior achievement and
demographic characteristics still find significant negative effects of mobility on achievement,
especially for students who move multiple times (e.g., Temple and Reynolds 1999, Strand
2002, Hanushek et al. 2004).6 Potential channels for this effect can be illustrated by ex-
work-related reasons, and 65% are for housing-related reasons (Schacter 2001a,b). Family and work-related
reasons may be even more important determinants of mobility for New York City students, the majority of
whom receive free lunch; Hanushek et al. (2004) report “among economically disadvantaged students [in the
NLSY], . . . the prevalence of a divorce or a job loss by the father was more than 50% greater in the year of a
school move than in years of non-moves.” In New York City, while the list of schools that received exemptions
from the standardized curricula was publicly available, information whether schools actually implemented it
was not.
6In the U.K., which has a national curriculum, Strand (2002) finds that conditional on prior test scores
and student characteristics, the math test scores of transfer students within one London Local Education
Authority (LEA) are 0.12 standard deviations lower than those of their non-mobile counterparts. Lyle (2006)
7pressing λit as follows:
λit = Xit[β(csˆt)− β(cst)]ρ+ γ1[cŝt 6= cst] + δit (1.2)
where ρ ∈[0,1] is a weighting factor that accounts for the amount of time the student
spent before the exam at her previous school sˆ and was affected by its curricula csˆt, and γ is
the part of the mobility achievement gap that can be attributed to students having to change
curricula when they change schools and is assumed to be less than or equal to 0. δit captures
all the other effects of changing schools on achievement (e.g., loss of social networks).
Standardization changes the curriculum for all students and improves the continuity of
instruction for mobile students. For non-movers, the difference between a student’s achieve-
ment under a standardized curriculum c˜ and schools’ chosen curriculum cst can be shown to
equal
Aist(Xit, cst = c˜,Mit = 0, it)− Aist(Xit, cst = cst,Mit = 0, it) = Xit[β(c˜)− β(cst)] (1.3)
while for movers, the difference equals
exploits a more plausibly exogenous source of variation in mobility — moves caused by military relocations
— and finds reduced achievement among military children who have experienced 3 or more moves. While
Hanushek et al. (2004) and Gibbons and Telhaj (2011) find evidence of peer effects of student mobility, the
model excludes peer effects for two reasons. First, using five years of NYC data, I did not find any evidence
of such peer effects in standard regressions of student achievement on peer characteristics and school-grade
fixed effects. Second, it is unlikely that curriculum standardization could benefit the peers of mobile students
without benefiting the mobile students themselves (i.e., by reducing the amount of instructional time needed
to help new students catch up or reducing disruptive behavior caused by new students feeling lost in new
material). Finally, estimates of mobility-related peer effects from Hanushek et al. in Texas and Gibbons
and Telhaj in the U.K. are quite similar, even though the U.K. has a national curriculum; this suggests that
mobility-related peer effects are unlikely related to changes in curricula.
8Aist(Xit, cst = c˜,Mit = 1, cŝt = c˜, δit, it)− Aist(Xit, cst = cst,Mit = 1, cŝt = cŝt, δit, it)
= Xit[β(c˜)− ρβ(cst)− (1− ρ)β(cŝt)]− γ1[cŝt 6= cst] (1.4)
As seen in 1.3, the effect of curriculum standardization on non-movers is determined
entirely by the gains (or losses) from changing the curriculum. Whether this difference is
positive or negative depends on the effect of the curriculum schools would have chosen in the
absence of curriculum standardization. Importantly, 1.3 could be negative if schools would
choose the achievement-maximizing curriculum for their expected student populations, but
standardization forced them to adopt a different one. But, 1.3 could be positive if schools
had not chosen the achievement-maximizing curriculum, for example, because they were
maximizing an outcome other than measured achievement.
For movers, the effect of curriculum standardization is a weighted average of the gains
from changing the curriculum and an extra term that measures the extent to which standard-
ization reduces achievement losses associated with differences between schools’ curricula. By
the assumptions on γ, the second term in 1.4 (-γ1[csˆt 6= cst]) is non-negative. Thus, even if
curriculum standardization resulted in the adoption of a curriculum that was not targeted
toward the characteristics of movers, it could still benefit them by eliminating the differences
between schools’ curricula. Ultimately, however, the effect of curriculum standardization on
student achievement is theoretically ambiguous and must be resolved empirically.
The model also highlights a separate empirical issue related to estimating
λˆ = E(λit|Xit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
causal effect of changing schools
+
Cov(it,Mit|Xit)
V ar(Mit|Xit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection bias
(1.5)
To estimate the causal effect of changing schools, I propose using the conditional achieve-
9ment gap between students who move after the exam (or school year) and non-mobile stu-
dents as an estimate of the bias term. These students do not change schools before achieve-
ment is measured, but they likely experience similar omitted factors (e.g., parents’ job loss,
divorce) as those who do change schools. If students who move before the exam are more
negatively selected than those who move after, this estimate provides a lower bound on
the magnitude of the bias term. Moreover, since we might expect all three terms in 1.2 to
be non-positive (i.e., movers do not systematically move to schools with curricula that are
worse for them, changing curricula harms achievement, and non-curriculum related effects
of changing schools harm achievement), the difference between the OLS estimate of λ and
the estimate of the bias term provides an upper bound on the magnitude of the achievement
loss related to changing curricula, γ.
1.3 Institutional Background
In January of 2003, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and District Schools Chancel-
lor Joel Klein unveiled an ambitious educational reform agenda called “Children First.” In
addition to a number of organizational reforms, the plan called for standardized math and
reading curricula to replace the 50 different math and 30 different reading programs that
were being used in New York City’s 1,200 schools.7 Notably, the Mayor and Chancellor an-
nounced that the “top 200” schools, which were revealed weeks later, would be exempt from
7The reforms included: replacing the 40 community and high school districts with 10 regional “instruc-
tional divisions” and 6 support centers, increasing principal authority over hiring and budget decisions,
closing local school district offices in city schools, putting a parent coordinator at each school, creating 10
support centers for parents, replacing elected school boards with parent engagement boards, reorganizing
special education and bilingual programs, and ending social promotion. Importantly, all of these reforms were
citywide, so their implementation did not depend on the same criteria as exemptions from the standardized
curricula.
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the standardized curriculum requirements for two years.8 A timeline of the events related to
the announcement and implementation of the standardized curricula reforms is displayed in
Figure 1.1.
Although many people believed that the exemptions would simply go to the 200 highest
scoring schools, which served predominately middle-class white and Asian students, the
Department of Education (DOE) based exemptions on a formula meant to ensure racial and
economic diversity. To determine exemptions, schools were separated into high-, medium-
and low-need categories based on the percentages of students receiving free lunch, English
Language Learner, and special education services. Different cutoffs, based on the percent of
students passing math and English Language Arts exams in 2002, were established for each
of the three categories.9
209 schools initially received exemptions based on these cutoffs, but schools that did
not receive an exemption were given the chance to appeal. 233 schools or special programs
in schools (e.g., gifted and talented) applied for an exemption during the appeals process,
but fewer than half received them; 31 schools or special programs within schools received
two-year exemptions, and 88 schools received one-year exemptions.10 My analysis is based
on the initial exemption cutoffs, but the appeals process explains why not all schools that
8Originally, the district intended to have a yearly re-evaluation process to extend and grant new exemp-
tions. However, Diana Lam, the Deputy Chancellor in charge of curriculum and instruction, resigned in
March 2004, and it is unclear if these re-evaluations occurred.
9For example, a school with 40 percent of students passing math and 60 percent passing English would
receive a score of 100. The exemption cutoff for low-need schools was 140 for elementary and middle schools
and 160 for high schools. Cutoffs for medium-need schools and high-need schools were set 15 and 30 points
lower, respectively, and were lowered an additional 10 points for schools that ranked in the top 20% of schools
making one-year gains citywide.
10Two-year exemptions in the appeals process were based on a formula similar to the one used to determine
the original 209 exemptions, except that math and reading results were analyzed separately instead of being
combined. Thus, some schools were only exempted from math, while others were only exempted from
reading. One-year exemptions in the appeals process were granted to schools based on special circumstances:
43 because they had received grants to carry out other curricula, 33 because they lacked testing data, 10
because they had made significant improvements in recent years, and 2 because of special needs.
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fell below the cutoff adopted the standardized curricula.
The standardized curricula were mandatory for all schools that did not receive an exemp-
tion, but exempt schools could still implement them voluntarily. In addition to selecting a
single curriculum per grade and prescribing an instructional approach, the standardized cur-
ricula mandated the minimum amounts of time daily that schools must dedicate to reading,
writing, and math. Complete details on the selected programs and their publishers can be
found in the Appendix (Table A1). Details on the minimum time limits are also provided,
although there is no evidence that these time limits were binding.11
The standardized reading curriculum started in fall 2003 and was based on a “balanced
literacy” approach that combined “whole-language” and “phonics-based” approaches to read-
ing instruction.12 One key component of the reading curriculum was the purchase of books
for classroom libraries, so students would read from books instead of basic readers. More con-
troversial was the DOE’s choice of Month-by-Month Phonics as its primary reading program
for grades K-3. Although proponents argued that a less scripted approach would improve
students’ critical thinking skills, critics charged that it “[fell] short as an effective systematic
phonics program [and its] effectiveness [had] not been validated scientifically” (Wolf 2007).13
The implementation of the standardized math curriculum was phased in over three years:
11A number of studies on the length of the school year, weather-related school closings, and subject-
specific instructional time provide evidence that increasing instructional time might improve achievement
(e.g., Pischke 2007, Marcotte 2008, Lavy 2010).
12Described in the DOE’s handbook A Comprehensive Approach to Balanced Literacy, “balanced literacy”
emphasized practices such as providing instruction in systemic phonemic awareness, phonics, spelling, and
word study; teaching students strategies for reading and writing; providing time for independent reading;
and engaging in shared reading. “ Whole-language” emphasizes reading for meaning and memorizing words
as whole units, while phonics teaches students to break down words into smaller components (e.g., letter
combinations) that can be joined together to form words. However, NYC’s “balanced literacy” approach
drew fire for its more whole-language approach to reading instruction.
13The National Reading Panel (2000) has identified systematic phonics instruction as producing significant
benefits for children’s reading and writing skills. In response to this criticism, the DOE supplemented
Month-by-Month Phonics with Voyager Passport. I have not found any credible studies on the effectiveness
of Month-by-Month Phonics or Voyager Passport.
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grades K-2, 6, and 9-12 by fall 2003; grades 3-5, and 7 by fall 2004; and grade 8 by fall
2005. The “ constructivist” math curricula Everyday Mathematics and Impact Mathematics
were selected for grades K-5 and 6-8, respectively.14 There is little credible evidence on
the effectiveness of Everyday Mathematics. The best study to date (Waite, 2000) compares
the math test scores of 732 students in grades 3, 4, and 5 in 6 schools using Everyday
Mathematics to those of 2,704 students in 12 schools matched on baseline achievement and
student demographics that were using a more traditional math curriculum. While the study’s
author concluded that Everyday Mathematics had a statistically significant positive effect on
math achievement, there were several methodological problems with the analysis that likely
lead to an overstatement of the program’s effects.15 I have been unable to find any research
studies on the effectiveness of Impact Mathematics.
14“Constructivist” or “ reform” math is distinguished from “ traditional” math by its student-centered
approach; it emphasizes students constructing math knowledge through their own processes of reasoning
and teaches multiple primary approaches to solving problems. Proponents of this approach argue that it
fosters a deeper understanding of math, while critics counter that multiple methods are confusing and hinder
students’ computational skills. The Report of the National Mathematics Advisory Panel (2008) finds that
high quality research does not support either exclusively “student-centered” or “teacher-directed” approaches
to math instruction. But, the Panel also reports that “ explicit-instruction” (i.e., providing clear models for
solving a problem type, allowing students to think aloud while solving problems, and providing feedback) is
beneficial for low-performing and learning disabled students. For example, Everyday Mathematics teaches
four methods for addition: “partial sums,” “column addition,” “fast method,” and “opposite change rule.”
Consider the problem 269+83. With “partial sums,” students move left to right, adding up the place
values represented by the digits in the column and then adding the partial sums, so the problem becomes
200+140+12= 352. In the “column addition” method, students write the addends in columns separated by




and do the carries
in the second stage. The “fast method” is the traditional right to left method of addition with carries. The
“opposite change rule” has students add and subtract the same numbers to simplify the math by making
one addend end in zero (e.g., 270+82). For a nice description of the Everyday Mathematics algorithms, see
http://math.nyu.edu/˜braams/links/em-arith.html
15In addition to the endogeneity of the schools’ curricula choices, Waite dropped teachers from the sample
if they had not followed the Everyday Mathematics curriculum to his liking (i.e., they reported using other
instructional materials for a majority of the instructional time, their lesson plans did not use Everyday
Mathematics curriculum daily, or their student assessments did not reflect the variety of the curriculum).
In addition, a U.S. Department of Education review concluded that the effects estimated by Waite lose
statistical significance when the standard errors allow for clustering.
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New York City spent an estimated $35 million for the math and phonics materials and
classroom libraries associated with the standardized curricula. To prepare teachers to use
the new curricula, the DOE offered voluntary training sessions during the summer — atten-
dance could not be required under the teachers’ union contract — and conducted mandatory
training during days prior to the start of school. Each school was also assigned a math and
a reading coach — at a cost of around $55,000 each — to provide teachers with training
and assistance with the new curricula during the school year, such as sharing instructional
strategies, modeling sample lessons, and helping them with lesson plans.16
1.4 Data
I use several sources of data from the New York City Department of Education to study
elementary and middle schools in the first two years after the inception of the standardized
curricula, school years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, hereafter referred to as the years 2004 and
2005, respectively. I do not examine effects in later years because, due to the two-year time
limit on exemptions, there is no longer a discontinuity in curricula adoption by 2005-2006.
Data on schools’ use of the standardized curricula come from administrative records of
schools’ purchases of standardized curricula materials (e.g., textbooks, workbooks, teacher
manuals, etc.), some of which are re-ordered each year. Data on purchases of materials for
non-standardized curricula, before standardization was implemented or for exempt schools
in the years afterward, are unavailable, but conversations with DOE personnel suggest that,
regardless, schools often combined pieces of different programs together to form their own
unique curriculum.17 The only exception is that some schools are listed on DOE documents
16Schools that did not adopt the standardized curricula received $110,000 to use at their discretion, $55,000
for each coach.
17I have limited data on prior curricula from the 2002 school report cards, where schools could voluntarily
list any curriculum programs they used. See Appendix Figure A3 and Appendix Table A3.
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as using two pieces of the standardized curricula (Everyday Mathematics and Month-by-
Month Phonics) prior to the citywide reform. I omit them from the math and/or reading
analysis when applicable.18
Data on test scores cover students in the 3rd through 8th grades, who are tested annually
in both math and reading. For math, due to its staggered implementation, I focus on students
in the 3rd through 6th grade in 2004 and 3rd through 7th grade in 2005. For reading, I
focus exclusively on students in 3rd grade, since the reading curriculum for 3rd grade (i.e.,
Month-by-Month Phonics) was better defined than that of higher grades, which were simply
required to follow the balanced literacy instructional approach. Student data also include
demographic characteristics and program participation (e.g., race, gender, free lunch, English
Language Learner, special education, place of birth), and identifiers that allow students to
be linked across years. More information on these data can be found in Kane et al. (2008).
To examine mobility, I use data on student enrollment which contain the dates on which
students were admitted to or discharged from New York City schools. This is distinct from
many studies on student mobility, which rely on one observation per student per year and
only observe students who move schools between school years (National Research Council
and Institute of Medicine 2010).19 I use these data to distinguish between different types of
mobility: (1) non-structural summer moves, which exclude moves related to school structure
(e.g., moves that occur from elementary to middle school or from schools that closed) (2)
moves during the school year that occur prior to an exam, and (3) moves during the school
year occurring after an exam. My focus on students who experience non-structural moves
18District 15 was already following the Everyday Mathematics and Month-by-Month Phonics curriculum,
and District 10 was already following Everyday Mathematics. District 15 schools have test scores that are
around 0.1 standard deviations better than the NYC average, while District 10 schools have test scores that
are about 0.2 standard deviations worse. Results including these schools are qualitatively similar, although
the first stages are slightly weaker because these schools were less likely to respond to the district’s mandate.
19Hanushek et al. (2004) observe one observation per student per six-week period.
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follows previous research on student mobility and is useful because these students may be
the most likely to benefit from curriculum standardization.20 The distinction between moves
before and after exams is also important for my empirical work; moves that occur after the
exam cannot have a causal effect on student achievement and can be used to test the validity
of interpreting estimated effects of mobility on achievement as causal. This is similar to the
strategy used by Herrmann and Rockoff (2010) to examine the causal impact of teacher
absence on student achievement.
Additional data include the list of the 159 elementary and middle schools that received ex-
emptions based on test score cutoffs, information on schools’ need categories (high, medium,
and low), and the percentages of students who passed the math and reading exams.21 Schools
received an exemption if (i) the sum of the percentage of students who passed the math and
reading exams met or exceeded the cutoff for their need category, or (ii) this sum was within
10 points of their cutoff and they placed in the top 20 percent of one-year gains citywide.
Despite the efforts of district staff, the exact formula the DOE used to calculate gains cannot
be located. However, using my calculations of the average gains students made between 2002
and 2001, I am able to match the first round exemption list relatively well. Thus, I use these
calculations to assign the top 20 percent of schools a cutoff 10 points lower than the normal
cutoff for their need category. Details on these calculations can be found in the Appendix
(Figure A1).
Figure 1.2 displays a scatter plot of the probability of receiving a first round exemption
on the difference between schools’ scores and their cutoff, averaged in 5-point bins. There is
a clear jump in the probability of receiving an exemption at the cutoff, with schools above
20Since moves due to school structure are usually predictable, schools may already align curricula for
students that experience structural moves.
2150 high schools also received exemptions.
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the cutoff about 60% more likely to receive an exemption.22 This evidence helps establish
the possibility of using a regression discontinuity design to evaluate the effect of curriculum
standardization on student achievement, although equally important is whether receiving an
initial exemption affects the probability that schools actually implement the standardized
curricula.
As exemptions were based on performance on tests almost one year before the announce-
ment of the Children First reforms, it is unlikely that schools manipulated their eligibility.
As a further check on the exogeneity of the exemption cutoffs, Figure 1.3 shows that the den-
sity of schools’ scores relative to the exemption cutoff is smooth, and the statistical density
test proposed by McCrary (2008) does not uncover any evidence of manipulation.
Table 1.1 presents the 2002 baseline characteristics of the schools included in the analysis,
separated by whether they fall above or below the exemption cutoff.23 For both math and
reading, student test scores are rescaled to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1
within each grade and year. Not surprisingly, schools above the exemption cutoff have higher
test scores, and fewer black, Hispanic, and free lunch students.
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics on the implementation of the standardized cur-
ricula. Implementation rates are substantially higher for schools below the cutoff than for
those above. Over 90% of the schools below the cutoff implemented the 3rd grade standard-
ized reading curriculum in 2004 and 2005, compared to about 30% and 40%, respectively, of
schools above the cutoff. For math, the rates of implementation are lower in 2004 than in
2005, since schools were not required to implement the standardized curriculum for grades
3-5 until 2005. However, by 2005, nearly 90% of schools below the cutoff had implemented
22This is partially due to measurement error in the assignment of schools to the top 20% or bottom 80%
citywide.
23Schools that serve students with moderate to severe disabilities and very low-performing schools man-
aged by the district’s central office are omitted from the analysis, though including these schools does not
noticeably change my results.
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the math curricula, compared to 40% of those above.
1.5 Empirical Approach
The DOE’s policy of granting exemptions from its standardized curricula based on whether
schools’ pre-determined test scores met or exceeded certain cutoffs presents an opportunity
to evaluate the effectiveness of these curricula using a regression discontinuity design. The
main idea behind the RD design, first introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and
since used in many studies in education, is that the schools whose scores fell just above the
cutoff, and were exempt from implementing the standardized curricula, are a good control
group for schools whose scores fell just below the cutoff and were required to implement
the standardized curricula.24 As long as any systematic relationship between schools’ scores
and student outcomes is smooth through the cutoff, the discontinuity in the probability of
treatment can be used to estimate the causal effect of the treatment. Consider the reduced
form regressions:
Aist = α + β[Zs < 0] + f(Zs) + φs +Xistλ+ εist (1.6)
SCist = µ+ δ[Zs < 0] + f(Zs) + θs +Xistpi + ηist (1.7)
where Aist is the test score of student i in school s in year t ; SCist is an indicator
variable for whether the student’s school implemented the standardized curricula; 1[Zs < 0]
is an indicator for whether the school’s rescaled score Zs is less than 0; f(Zs) is a flexible
control function for the school’s rescaled score (i.e., a linear model estimated separately on
both sides of the cutoff); φs and θs are cutoff fixed effects; Xist is a vector of year-grade
24For example, these studies include van der Klauww (2002); Jacob and Lefgren (2004); Chay, McEwan,
and Urquiola (2005).
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fixed effects and student and school-grade peer characteristics (e.g., race, gender, free lunch,
English Language Learner, special education, foreign born, moved prior to the exam, moved
prior to the school year); and ist and ηist are error terms, which are clustered at the school
level.
The coefficient β provides the “ intent-to-treat” estimate of how much a student’s test
score improves if her school’s score is just below, rather than just above, the cutoff for its
need and gains category. The coefficient δ estimates the “first-stage” relationship between the
school’s score falling below the cutoff and its implementation of the standardized curricula.
Taking the ratio β
δ
yields the treatment effect that would be estimated from a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) instrumental variables regression. Under the assumptions of monotonicity
(i.e., falling short of the cutoff cannot cause some schools to adopt the standardized curricula
while causing others to reject it) and excludability (i.e., falling short of the cutoff cannot
affect student achievement except through the implementation of the curricula), this ratio
estimates the causal effect of the treatment (Lee and Lemieux 2010).
In this present case, the 2SLS approach corresponds to a “fuzzy,” rather than “sharp,”
regression discontinuity design (RD), because neither the first round exemptions nor the
adoption of the curricula are perfectly determined by falling below the cutoff. For instance,
some schools below the cutoff received exemptions in the appeals process, and schools that
received exemptions because they were above the cutoff could still voluntarily adopt the
standardized curricula. As illustrated in the conceptual framework, the treatment effect
estimate β
δ
represents a composite of gains (or losses) from changing curricula and gains
from reducing the losses associated with moving.
Since only a small minority of students is mobile, one would expect the RD estimate to re-
flect primarily effects due to the changes in curricula. However, whether standardization has
differential effects on movers is still of interest. Thus, I also estimate separate specifications
for different types of mobile students.
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1.6 Results
Before moving to the main results, Table 1.3 displays balancing tests for student charac-
teristics. Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A verify that there are no pre-treatment differences in
students’ 2002 math and reading test scores. I use the same specification, grades, and band-
widths as the main regression results; my preferred bandwidths are 39 for math and 22 for
reading, which were calculated using the “leave-one out” procedure described in Imbens and
Lemieux (2008) (see the Appendix for more details). The remaining columns use the data
from years 2004 and 2005 and present the results from a regression of each characteristic
on an indicator for being below the cutoff, controlling for cutoff and year-grade fixed effects
and separate linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. These columns illustrate that the
observable characteristics are balanced across the cutoff; only one characteristic, female, is
even marginally statistically significant, and this difference, 1 percent, is small in magnitude.
Figure 1.4 provides a graphical analysis of the first stage results for the effect of being
below the cutoff on implementing the standardized curricula. Each panel in Figure 1.4
plots the average residuals from a regression of the fraction of students for whom the school
implemented the standardized curricula on cutoff and year fixed effects and the fitted values
from locally weighted regressions of the residuals on schools’ distances from the cutoff.25
Panel A shows that schools just below the cutoff were about 20% more likely to implement
the standardized math curricula than those just above. There is not full compliance below
the cutoff because the curriculum requirement for grades 3-5 was not binding until 2005.
Panel C shows that for reading, schools just below the cutoff were around 30% more likely
to implement the standardized curriculum than those just above, a larger discontinuity than
in math. Panels B and D display similar residual plots where the school’s average test score
in 2004 and 2005 replaces the use of the standardized curriculum as the dependent variable.
25In this figure, the unit of analysis is the school, and each school receives the same weight.
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In contrast to Panels A and C, there are no sharp discontinuities in test scores at the cutoff
for receiving an exemption.
A formal RD analysis is presented in Table 1.4, which reports the results from regressions
using student-level data, which are analogous to the specifications in Table 1.3, Columns 1
and 2. However, in Table 1.4, I add one more panel for math results that control for
cubic polynomials in prior math and reading test scores. These controls help to reduce
the standard errors of the test score outcomes but are only available for grades 4-7, so I
cannot add a corresponding panel for the reading sample, which only includes third graders.
The regressions in Table 1.4 control for cutoff and year-grade fixed effects, separate linear
trends on both sides of the cutoff, and student and school-grade peer characteristics. The first
three columns report the estimated discontinuities in the implementation of the standardized
curricula for three different bandwidths around the cutoff: (i) 58 points (the maximum
distance on the right side of the cutoff), (ii) the cross-validation bandwidths (39 points for
math and 22 points for reading), and (iii) a bandwidth 5 points within the cross-validation
bandwidth (34 points for math and 17 points for reading).
These results show that there is a relatively strong first stage for the implementation
of the math and reading standardized curricula. However, as expected from Figure 1.4,
Columns 4-6 find no significant effect on test scores. The reduced form point estimates
for the cross-validated bandwidths are all very close to zero, -0.004 standard deviations for
math (when controlling for prior test scores) and -0.007 standard deviations in reading.
The standard errors of these estimates are around 0.02 in math and 0.04 in reading, ruling
out “ intent-to-treat” improvements of more than 0.03 standard deviations in math and
0.08 standard deviations in reading at the 95% confidence level. While the estimates are
somewhat imprecise, the associated 95% confidence interval for the 2SLS estimate for 4th and
5th graders in math, who used the Everyday Mathematics curriculum, is [-0.33, 0.24], ruling
out an improvement of 0.28 standard deviations, the effect size that Waite (2000) reports
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for Everyday Mathematics.26 The corresponding confidence interval for the 2SLS estimates
for the balanced literacy reading program (i.e., Month-by-Month Phonics) is [-0.26, 0.22].
For comparison, in a randomized trial, Borman et al. (2007) found that a different literacy
and school reform program (Success for All) increased test scores on the Woodcock Word
Attack scale by a statistically significant 0.22 standard deviations in its first year and 0.25
in its second year.27 The estimates rule out similarly large effects for NYC’s standardized
curricula, although it is worth noting that Success for All is a very intensive intervention.28
Like any study based on RD methodology, I can only identify the local average treat-
ment effect (LATE) of the standardized curricula for schools that were close to the exemption
threshold, which were relatively high-performing schools within each school need category.
One might expect the average treatment effect (ATE) of curriculum standardization to be
higher, since standardization may have the largest benefits for low-performing schools. Un-
fortunately, the way the curricula were implemented does not allow me to cleanly disentangle
whether any improvements in the test scores of low-performing schools are related to the
26This estimate is not shown in the table. Evaluating the effectiveness of this curriculum requires disag-
gregating by grade, since Everyday Mathematics was implemented for grades 3-5 and Impact Mathematics
was implemented for grades 6 and 7.
27They found no statistically significant effects on three other reading measures in the first year but
found statistically significant effects on two other literacy measures in the second year. Effect sizes on these
measures ranged from 0.21 to 0.36 standard deviations in the third year (Borman et al. 2007).
28Components of Success for All include: grouping students by performance levels for reading lessons,
assessing students at 8 week intervals for regrouping, creating a Family Support Team to identify and
address problems that interfere with school performance (e.g., poor attendance, problems at home), and
designating a full-time Program Facilitator. See Borman et al. (2007) for more details about Success for
All. The cost-effectiveness of curriculum standardization relative to other education interventions can also
be evaluated. Assuming that the standardized curricula affected around 80% of students in 1,000 New York
City schools, a rough estimate of this program’s per-pupil cost is around $180. Of course, this estimate
may be too high because it does not account for the cost of the curriculum materials that would have been
purchased in the absence of standardized curricula. The standardized curricula were estimated to produce
less than 0.17 standard deviations gain in math and less than 0.25 standard deviations gain in reading.
However, since improvements of 0.20 standard deviations are usually orders of magnitude more expensive,
NYC’s standardized curricula do not seem particularly cost ineffective. For example, Project STAR, the
famous class size experiment conduced in Tennessee, cost $16,000 per 0.2 standard deviations gain; Success
for All was considerably cheaper, at $1,500 to $2,600 per 0.2 standard deviations (Loeb and McEwan 2010).
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standardized curricula, other Children First reforms (e.g., changes to the special education
and ELL programs), or mean reversion (see Chay et al. 2005).29
However, I can assess whether curriculum standardization has heterogeneous effects by
school type by disaggregating the results by school need groups (high-, medium-, and low-),
which were one determinant of schools’ cutoffs. Exemptions were granted to the highest per-
forming schools within each need group, but exempt schools in higher need groups generally
had lower baseline achievement than exempt schools in lower need groups. The results are
presented in Table 1.5. The main take-away from this table is that the exemption crite-
ria primarily induced medium need schools to implement the standardized curricula. This
appears to be related to general differences in the rates of implementation by need group;
below the cutoff, low need schools were the least likely to implement the curricula, possibly
because they may have been more likely to apply for and utilize second round exemptions,
while above the cutoff, high need schools were the most likely go along with the district
and implement the curricula. Nonetheless, this table also finds no significant effect of the
standardized curricula on students’ math or reading scores for any need group.
In addition to the type of schools, the effect of curriculum standardization could also
depend on the type of students (e.g., low-performing versus high-performing students). For
instance, in a randomized control trial in Kenya, Glewwe et al. (2009) find that providing
textbooks only increased the test scores of students with high initial achievement, likely
because they were the only ones who could read the textbooks, which were written in English.
Similarly, the balanced literacy and constructivist math curricula used in New York City
might have been better suited for high achieving students since the less scripted approach
29The RD design allows the effect of the standardized curricula to be disentangled from the other Children
First reforms at the cutoff, since the other reforms were citywide and student characteristics are smooth
through the cutoff. Concurrent reforms are a generally a problem for identifying the effect of curriculum
standardization. For example, in Los Angeles, a standardized curriculum was simultaneously implemented
for the entire district at around the same time as reductions in class size, and in Pittsburgh, a standardized
curriculum was implemented along with reforms in principal pay and teacher mentoring.
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to literacy and student-centered approach to math might have required highly educated
teachers and well-behaved students. Thus, I also estimated specifications that disaggregated
the results by student characteristics (including prior test scores for math), measures of
teacher quality (teacher experience, whether teachers have a master’s degree), and the year
of implementation.30 These results, which are available from the author upon request, also
fail to uncover differential effects of the standardized curricula for any group.
Despite finding no significant effects on overall student achievement or the achievement
of various groups of students, it is still reasonable to believe that curriculum standardization
could benefit mobile students. In the sample, about 6 percent of students move during the
school year (5.5 percent before the math exam) and about 9 percent of students move for non-
structural reasons (e.g., residential mobility) each summer. Table 1.6 provides information
on the characteristics of these movers by reporting the coefficients from probit regressions of
an indicator for each of type of move on prior math and reading test scores, indicators for
missing test scores, controls for student characteristics, and year-grade fixed effects.31 These
regressions confirm that mobile students have lower achievement even before their moves.
Of students who move during the school year, those who move before the exam appear more
negatively selected on observables than those who move afterwards. Similarly, of students
who experience non-structural moves during the summer, those who move before the current
school year appear more negatively selected on observables than those move after the current
school year.
Figure 1.5 provides more detailed information on the origin and destination schools of
mobile students. The panels illustrate the composition of moves that occurred before the
30The separate analysis by year of implementation addresses the concern that the effects of curriculum
standardization might be significant and positive once teachers learn the new curricula. It is also worth
nothing that other studies (e.g. Waite (2000) and Borman et al. (2007) find effects in the first year.
31Test scores are missing for students from other districts and for 3rd graders.
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math exam and for non-structural reasons before the school year. This figure shows that
schools below the cutoff receive the majority of students who move and that a small number of
students cross the cutoff when they change schools.32 The fact that a large portion of movers
come from outside the school district suggests that district-wide curriculum standardization
may have little scope to improve the achievement of the average mover.
Table 1.7 reports results where the RD is separately estimated by three types of students:
1) those who experience no mobility before the school year or exam, 2) those who experience
mobility during the school year before the exam, and 3) those who experience non-structural
mobility before the school year. For mobile students, the distance from the cutoff is coded
based on their destination schools, so the RD for mobile students compares those who moved
to schools just below the cutoff to those who moved to schools just above. I only estimate
effects for non-structural movers in 2005 because standardization only improves instructional
continuity for students who moved in the summer of 2004. In addition, since one might
expect standardization to primarily benefit students who moved between schools that used
the standardized curricula, I also estimate specifications that restrict the sample of movers
to those whose origin schools fell below the cutoff.
This table does not provide strong evidence that the curriculum standardization benefits
mobile students in general or mobile students who were most likely to move between schools
using the same curricula.33 There is one coefficient for movers before the reading exam
that is positive at the 5 percent level, but it is based on a very small sample. In addition,
its first stage does not appear to have the power to identify an effect, and this result is
not corroborated by the results in math. Nevertheless, this raises the question of how much
32There are more schools below the cutoff than above, but rates of mobility are still disproportionately
higher in schools below the cutoff.
33The large decline in the sample size for movers between Panel A and Panel B is due to the fact that
about 40% of mobile students in grades 4-7 lack prior test scores.
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curriculum standardization could plausibly be expected to increase the achievement of mobile
students.
This question is explored in Table 1.8, which evaluates how much scope there is for
curriculum standardization to reduce the achievement gap associated with student mobility.
A unique feature of the data used for this study is that they contain information on the exact
timing of students’ moves. This enables me to conduct a test of how much of the estimated
effects of student mobility on achievement could be causally attributed to changing schools.
Since moves after the exam – either during the school year or during the summer – cannot
have a causal effect on student test scores, the relationship between these moves and test
scores likely provides a lower bound on the amount of omitted variable bias that could be
generated by unobserved factors that are correlated with student mobility (e.g., parents’ job
loss, divorce).34 For this analysis, I use a sample of 3rd through 7th graders in both math
and reading in 2004 and 2005; this allows me to control for prior test scores in the results for
reading, which is not possible in the previous reading sample that only includes 3rd graders.
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 1.8 report the coefficients from regressions of student test scores
on indicators for different types of moves, controlling for student characteristics and year-
grade fixed effects. These columns demonstrate that student mobility is clearly associated
with lower test scores. The achievement gap for students who move before the exam is -0.35
standard deviations in math and -0.23 in reading; for students who move before the school
year, the gap is -0.13 in math and -0.10 in reading. However, both the results from Table 1.6
and the significant achievement gaps for students who move after the exam or school year
suggest that this relationship could be driven by selection. Columns 2 and 4 follow previous
literature on student mobility and attempt to deal with selection bias by controlling for cubic
34It is a lower bound if students who move before the exam are more negatively selected than those who
move after the exam. Table 1.6 suggests that this is likely the case for observable characteristics, but it hard
to say whether this true for unobservable factors.
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polynomials in students’ prior math and reading scores. Consistent with the results being
driven by selection, the inclusion of controls for prior test scores significantly reduces all of
the estimated effects of mobility on achievement. In math, the coefficient on moves before
the exam falls from -0.35 to -0.06, and the coefficient on moves before the school year falls
from -0.13 to -0.01; similar reductions occur in reading.35 Moreover, once I control for prior
test scores, the effects of mobility after the exam or after the school year are at least as large
as the effects of mobility before the exam or before the school year.
Figure 1.6 extends the analysis of the relationship between the timing of moves and
achievement. This figure plots the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from a
regression of test scores on indicators for student mobility at different times around the
math or reading exam (i.e., more than 7 months before the exam, 4-7 months before the
exam, 0-3 months before the exam, 0-3 months after the exam, and more than 3 months
after the exam), controlling for prior test scores, student characteristics, and year-grade
fixed effects. If mobility only causes low achievement by interrupting the continuity of
instruction, one might expect students who move in the middle of the pre-exam period to
have the largest declines in achievement; relative to students who move in the middle of
pre-exam period, students who move early in the year or very close to the exam have longer
periods of continuous instruction. This causal pathway would also imply that there should
be no achievement losses for students who do not change schools until after the exam. If, on
the other hand, achievement losses are caused by omitted variables (e.g., divorce, job loss)
that are correlated with mobility, one might expect these losses to reflect the correlation
between the omitted variables and achievement. Mobility after the exam could appear to
have a large negative effect on achievement if it indicates the student had a difficult home
life during the exam period. Consistent with the omitted variables story, there are large
35Some of this reduction is due to changes in the sample composition.
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achievement gaps for students who move after the exam, and these are similar in magnitude
to the achievement gaps for the equivalent time windows before the exam. Taken together,
these findings suggest that factors correlated with mobility could potentially explain all
of the achievement gap between mobile and non-mobile students, leaving little scope for
improvement through curriculum standardization.
1.7 Discussion and Conclusions
A major debate over the benefits of centralization has emerged in the education sector over
the issue of curriculum standardization. To shed light on this issue, I examine a substantial
reform that standardized math and reading curricula for students in New York City public
schools. I estimate the effect of standardization on student achievement using a regression
discontinuity design. Schools that fell below a sharp exemption cutoff were more likely to
adopt the standardized curricula, but these curricula changes did not have a significant ef-
fect on student achievement. The “intent-to-treat” estimates for falling below the cutoff
are insignificant and very close to 0; the 2SLS estimates are fairly imprecise — [-0.22, 0.17]
standard deviations in math and [-0.26, 0.22] standard deviations in reading — but exclude
prior estimates from some other studies of curricula.36 I also find no evidence that cur-
riculum standardization significantly benefits mobile students. Importantly, this is because
negative selection, not differences in schools’ curricula, appears to be the main cause of the
achievement gap between mobile and non-mobile students.
Since this paper examines the effect of specific math and reading curricula implemented
in New York City (e.g., Everyday Mathematics, Month-by-Month Phonics), it is unknown to
what extent these results may generalize to other contexts or curricular choices. However,
this study does highlight a few broad facts about curriculum standardization which may
36These estimates for math include students in grades 4-7 and control for prior test scores.
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be applicable in other settings: First, it is unlikely to improve the achievement of mobile
students. Since most of the mobility achievement gap appears to be related to negative
selection, schools seeking to improve the achievement of mobile students should focus on
more targeted educational interventions (e.g., tutoring) rather than standardization. More-
over, even if differences in schools’ curricula do harm the achievement of mobile students,
standardization is limited in its ability to help mobile students who come from outside of
its area of implementation (e.g., other districts, states, or countries). This paper finds that
many mobile students in NYC come from outside of the school district, and Strand (2002)
finds that a large fraction of mobile students in the U.K., which has a national curriculum,
come from abroad.
Second, given that curriculum standardization is unlikely to benefit mobile students, the
relevant debate should be over whether the proposed standardized curricula are more effective
at raising students’ achievement than their alternatives. Standardization may be warranted
if there are curricula that raise the achievement for all types of students, and schools are
not using them. On the other hand, if the effectiveness of curricula depends on the type of
students, standardization is only preferable if it mandates curricula that are better matched
to students’ characteristics. The effectiveness of various curricula remains an important topic
for future research, but this study suggests that implementation of standardized curricula
may have smaller effects on achievement than some previous studies might suggest.
Finally, this study only examines student achievement and does not account for any other
possible benefits of curriculum standardization, such as reductions in administrative costs or
quantity discounts from ordering large amounts of curriculum materials. It is worth pointing
out that even if standardization reduced test scores, it could still be justified if it resulted in
sufficiently large cost-savings.
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Figure 1.1: Timeline of Events Related to the Implementation of the Standardized Curricula
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Figure 1.2: First Round Exemptions
Figure 2: First Round Exemptions 
 
 
Notes: The figure plots the probability of receiving a first round exemption on the difference between schools’ 
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Notes: The figure plots the probability of receiving a first round exemption on the difference
between schools’ scores and the cutoff for their need group and improvement category.
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Notes: Panel A plots a histogram of rescaled scores for the schools used in the analysis.Panel B
plots the density test proposed by McCrary (2008) for these schools, which has a coefficient and
standard error of -0.1532 and 0.2501, respectively.
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Figure 1.4: Standardized Curricula and Test Scores
Panel A: Standardized Math Curricula Panel B: Math Test Scores
Panel C: Standardized Reading Curricula Panel D: Reading Test Scores
Notes: All panels plot residuals from a regression of the dependent variable on cutoff and year
fixed effects and the fitted values of locally weighted regressions of these residuals on schools
rescaled scores, estimated separately on each side of the cutoff using Statas lowess command and
a bandwidth of 0.8. The dependent variable is the fraction of students for whom the school
implemented the standardized curricula in Panels A and C and the average test score in Panels B
and D.
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Figure 1.5: Origin and Destination Schools’ Positions Relative to Cutoff
Panel A: Moves During the Year Before the Math Exam
Figure 5: Origin and Destination Schools’ Positions Relative to Cutoff 
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Notes: These statistics include students in the analysis sample on the date of the math exam and are averaged over 
the years 2004-2005.  In each panel, the fraction of students sums to 1.  Other schools mostly includes students from 
outside of the district (i.e., missing previous school information and not previously enrolled in the district) but also 
includes late enrollments (i.e., students who were previously enrolled in the district but who were not enrolled in a 
NYC school until after October 1 of the current school year) and students from schools whose position relative to 
the cutoff is undefined (e.g., schools were not open in 2002). 
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Notes: These statistics include students in the analysis sample on the date f the math exam and
are averaged over the years 2004-2005. In each panel, the fraction of students sums to 1. O her
schools mostly includes students from outside of the district (i.e., missing previous school
information and not previously enrolled in the district) but also includes late enrollments (i.e.,
students who were previously enrolled in the district but who were not enrolled in a NYC school
until after October 1 of the current school year) and students from schools whose position relative
to the cutoff is undefined (e.g., schools were not open in 2002).
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Notes: These figures plot the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from a regression of
test scores on indicators for student mobility at different times around the math and reading
exam (>7 months before the exam, 4-7 months before the exam, 0-3 months before the exam, 0-3
months after the exam, >3 months after the exam). Both the math and reading samples contain
students in grades 3-7 in 2004 and 2005. All specifications include year-grade fixed effects and
control for cubic polynomials in prior math and reading test scores and student characteristics
(Female, Black, Hispanic, Other Race, Foreign Born, Free Lunch, English Language Learner,
Special Education, Mover Prior to the Exam, Non-Structural Mover Prior to the School Year).
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics - Baseline 2002
Characteristic Below Above
Math Test Score -0.09 0.70
(0.33) (0.28)








Asian/Other Race 0.08 0.26
(0.12) (0.21)
Foreign Born 0.12 0.14
(0.08) (0.09)
Free Lunch 0.87 0.59
(0.16) (0.27)
English Lang. Learner 0.07 0.01
(0.08) (0.02)
Special Education 0.07 0.03
(0.06) (0.05)
Moved During Year - Before Exam 0.05 0.03
(0.03) (0.02)
Moved Prior to Year - Non-Structural 0.09 0.07
(0.04) (0.03)
Number of Schools 675 151
Number of Students 307336 50208
Notes: The sample includes students in grades 3-7 who were enrolled in schools
in the analysis sample on the date of the math exam. The columns display school-level
means of student characteristics.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics on Implementation
2004 2005
Variables Below Above Below Above
Standardized Math Curricula 0.62 0.13 0.92 0.41
(0.45) (0.32) (0.24) (0.48)
Standardized Reading Curricula 0.94 0.26 0.96 0.36
(0.23) (0.44) (0.20) (0.48)
Notes: For math, the school-level means and standard deviations
of the variables are presented for students in grades 3-6 in 2004 and
grades 3-7 in 2005 who were enrolled in schools in the analysis
sample on the date of the math exam. For reading, statistics are
presented for students in grade 3.
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Table 1.3: Balancing Tests
2002 Test Scores 2004-2005 Characteristics
Panel A Math Score Reading Score Female Black Hispanic Other
Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1[score<cutoff] -0.0203 0.0003 0.0101+ 0.0355 -0.0082 0.0229
(0.0201) (0.0340) (0.0058) (0.0514) (0.0392) (0.0408)
Controls for
Characteristics Yes Yes No No No No
R-squared 0.325 0.227 0.000 0.065 0.099 0.057
N 166509 23692 317162 317162 317162 317162
2004-2005 Characteristics
Panel B Moved Moved
Before Before Foreign
Free Lunch ELL Special Ed Exam Year Born
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1[score<cutoff] 0.0428 0.0091 -0.0061 -0.0046 -0.0044 0.0148
(0.0337) (0.0172) (0.0093) (0.0033) (0.0046) (0.0186)
Controls for
Characteristics No No No No No No
R-squared 0.209 0.024 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.013
N 317162 317162 317162 317162 317162 317162
Notes: All specifications include cutoff and grade-year fixed effects and separate linear trends on both
sides of the cutoff. All specifications use a bandwidth of 39 and students in grades 3-7, except for
column (2), which uses a bandwidth of 22 and only includes students in grade 3. Characteristics controls
include controls for student and school-grade peer characteristics (Female, Black, Hispanic, Other Race,
Foreign Born, Free Lunch, English Language Learner, Special Education, Mover Prior to the Exam,
Non-Structural Mover Prior to the School Year). Standard errors are clustered by school and displayed
in parentheses. Significance levels are + 0.10 * 0.05 **0.01.
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Table 1.4: Baseline Results
Standardized Curriculum Test Scores
CV CV
Bandwidth Bandwidth
Within 58 CV Minus 5 Within 58 CV Minus 5
points Bandwidth points points Bandwidth points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Math
1[score<cutoff] 0.2186** 0.1902** 0.2085** 0.0320 0.0090 -0.0062
(0.0609) (0.0725) (0.0771) (0.0244) (0.0285) (0.0312)
R-squared 0.382 0.362 0.344 0.320 0.302 0.292
N 457151 317149 269144 457151 317149 269144
Panel B: Math With Controls for Prior Test Scores
1[score<cutoff] 0.2243** 0.1845* 0.2030* 0.0123 -0.0043 -0.0103
(0.0645) (0.0777) (0.0828) (0.0171) (0.0182) (0.0194)
R-squared 0.381 0.355 0.332 0.667 0.652 0.644
N 293601 199242 168197 293601 199242 168197
Panel C: Reading
1[score<cutoff] 0.4533** 0.3466** 0.3929** 0.0382 -0.0070 0.0440
(0.0755) (0.1211) (0.1428) (0.0278) (0.0433) (0.0466)
R-squared 0.544 0.420 0.362 0.286 0.239 0.242
N 103425 42156 32884 103425 42156 32884
Notes: All specifications include cutoff and grade-year fixed effects and control for student
and school-grade peer characteristics (Female, Black, Hispanic, Other Race, Foreign Born,
Free Lunch, English Language Learner, Special Education, Mover Prior to the Exam, Non-
Structural Mover Prior to the School Year). Specifications in Panel B only include students
in grades 4-7 and include controls for cubic polynomials in prior math and reading test scores.
For math, the cross-validated bandwidth is 39, and for reading, the cross-validated bandwidth
is 22. Standard errors are clustered by school and displayed in parentheses.
Significance levels are + 0.10 * 0.05 **0.01.
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Table 1.5: Results by Need Group
High Medium Low
Standard- Test Standard- Test Standard- Test
ized Scores ized Scores ized Scores
Curriculum Curriculum Curriculum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Math
1[score<cutoff] 0.0968 0.0163 0.4360** -0.0149 0.1211 0.0019
(0.1313) (0.0658) (0.1189) (0.0385) (0.1217) (0.0438)
R-squared 0.298 0.238 0.385 0.260 0.424 0.280
N 104491 104491 116978 116978 95680 95680
Panel B: Math With Controls for Prior Test Scores
1[score<cutoff] 0.0726 -0.0329 0.4283** -0.0135 0.1253 0.0169
(0.1314) (0.0433) (0.1218) (0.0349) (0.1301) (0.0224)
R-squared 0.291 0.622 0.365 0.638 0.418 0.631
N 61361 61361 70314 70314 67567 67567
Panel C: Reading
1[score<cutoff] 0.2081 0.0864 0.4352* 0.0211 0.4091+ -0.1080
(0.1733) (0.0704) (0.2087) (0.0581) (0.2089) (0.0657)
R-squared 0.424 0.190 0.506 0.203 0.457 0.229
N 12031 12031 15657 15657 14468 14468
Note: All specifications use the CV bandwidths of 39 points for math and 22 points for
reading. They include cutoff and year-grade fixed effects and control for student and
school-grade peer characteristics (Female, Black, Hispanic, Other Race, Foreign Born,
Free Lunch, English Language Learner, Special Education, Mover Prior to the Exam, Non-
Structural Mover Prior to the School Year). Standard errors clustered by school are
displayed in parentheses. Significance levels are + 0.10 * 0.05 **0.01.
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Table 1.6: Probit Regressions of Type of Moves on Student Characteristics
Moves During Non-Structural
the Year Summer Moves
Characteristic Before the Exam After the Exam Before the Year After the Year
Prior Math Score -0.1078** -0.0774** -0.0650** -0.0438**
(0.0050) (0.0094) (0.0044) (0.0041)
Prior Reading Score -0.0850** -0.0395** -0.0891** -0.0142**
(0.0054) (0.0101) (0.0046) (0.0042)
Missing Prior 1.2493** 0.3319** 1.2735** 0.1687**
Math Score (0.0145) (0.0312) (0.0127) (0.0141)
Missing Prior -0.0355* 0.0122 0.1536** 0.0313*
Reading Score (0.0144) (0.0301) (0.0123) (0.0129)
Female -0.0350** -0.0390** -0.0125** -0.0242**
(0.0056) (0.0109) (0.0047) (0.0045)
Black 0.2665** -0.0249 0.2481** 0.1693**
(0.0107) (0.0188) (0.0083) (0.0080)
Hispanic 0.1880** -0.0476* 0.1483** 0.1104**
(0.0107) (0.0190) (0.0084) (0.0080)
Other Race 0.1271** 0.0417+ 0.0310** 0.0082
(0.0121) (0.0216) (0.0100) (0.0094)
Foreign Born 0.2653** 0.1055** 0.0703** 0.0228**
(0.0075) (0.0155) (0.0071) (0.0070)
Free Lunch 0.1295** 0.1653** 0.0034 0.0196**
(0.0102) (0.0202) (0.0076) (0.0074)
English Lang. Learner 0.0754** -0.0029 0.0464** 0.0199*
(0.0094) (0.0196) (0.0085) (0.0087)
Special Education 0.1898** 0.0605** 0.1409** 0.1647**
(0.0104) (0.0205) (0.0093) (0.0088)
Notes: This table displays the coefficients from probit regressions of the type of move
on student characteristics and year-grade fixed effects. N=625390. Standard errors are
clustered by school and displayed in parentheses. Significance levels are +0.10 *0.05 **0.01.
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Before the Exam School Year
Only From Only From
From Any Schools From Any Schools
Non-Movers School Below Cutoff School Below Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Math
Standardized 0.1879* 0.2511** 0.2711** 0.2027* 0.1943*
Curriculum (0.0728) (0.0723) (0.0813) (0.0865) (0.0904)
Test Scores 0.0134 0.0223 0.0357 -0.0699 -0.0477
(0.0285) (0.0501) (0.0640) (0.0603) (0.0799)
N 277692 13212 5080 12941 5016
Panel B: Math With Controls for Prior Test Scores
Standardized 0.1821* 0.2810** 0.2864** 0.1822+ 0.1582
Curriculum (0.0779) (0.0835) (0.0897) (0.0984) (0.1089)
Test Scores -0.0024 -0.0396 -0.0550 -0.0468 -0.0615
(0.0181) (0.0446) (0.0575) (0.0561) (0.0727)
N 185747 4212 2753 4577 2849
Panel C: Reading
Standardized 0.3515** 0.2990* 0.1730 0.3329* 0.3603**
Curriculum (0.1216) (0.1326) (0.1436) (0.1353) (0.1355)
Test Scores -0.0027 0.1065 0.2711* -0.0138 0.1811
(0.0433) (0.0777) (0.1364) (0.0970) (0.1326)
N 36939 1536 730 1717 704
Note: All specifications use the CV bandwidths of 39 points for math and 22 points
for reading. They include cutoff and year-grade fixed effects and control for student
and school-grade peer characteristics (Female, Black, Hispanic, Other Race, Foreign
Born, Free Lunch, English Language Learner, Special Education). Standard errors
clustered by school are displayed in parentheses. Significance levels are + 0.10
* 0.05 **0.01.
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Table 1.8: Re-evaluating the effect of mobility on student achievement
Math Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Move During Year Before Exam -0.3524** -0.0631** -0.2300** -0.0352**
(0.0083) (0.0053) (0.0083) (0.0055)
Move During Year After Exam -0.1786** -0.0790** -0.1707** -0.0716**
(0.0143) (0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0098)
Non-structural Move Before Year -0.1272** -0.0130** -0.0986** -0.0080+
(0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0043)
Non-structural Move After Year -0.0997** -0.0322** -0.0869** -0.0240**
(0.0055) (0.0036) (0.0056) (0.0034)
Controls for Prior Test Score No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.296 0.678 0.275 0.667
N 688366 478796 635152 482084
Note: Both the math and reading samples contain students in grades 3-7 in 2004
and 2005. All specifications include year-grade fixed effects and control for student
characteristics (Female, Black, Hispanic, Other Race, Foreign Born, Free Lunch,
English Language Learner, Special Education, Mover Prior to the Exam, Non-
Structural Mover Prior to the School Year). Controls for prior test scores are cubic
polynomials in prior math and reading test scores. Standard errors are clustered by
school and displayed in parentheses. Significance levels are + 0.10 * 0.05 **0.01.
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Chapter 2




Economists have studied peer effects in a wide range of settings — retirement savings choices,
efficiency at work, neighborhoods, and education — and have arrived at varying conclusions
regarding their importance (e.g., Duflo and Saez 2002; Mas and Moretti 2009; Oreopoulos
2003; Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007; Hanushek et al. 2003; Angrist and Lang 2004; Hoxby
and Weingarth 2005; Imberman et al. 2009, Carrell et al. 2012). While there are a number
of possible explanations for these differing results (different settings, difficulties in defining
the relevant peer groups, bias due to the endogeneity of peer group formation, etc.), one
possibility is that economic agents may take actions which compensate for and conceal peer
effects.
This paper focuses on one such action taken by schools — the referral of disabled students
to special education services — which may ameliorate negative peer effects. Studies have
found that having more peers that receive special education services does not reduce, and
may even increase, the achievement of regular education students (Hanushek et al. 2002;
Friesen el al. 2010).1 While these results seem somewhat surprising since disabled students
are more likely to have low achievement and behavioral problems, I argue that these findings
are consistent with the notion that special education mitigates negative peer effects.
I illustrate this argument by using panel data on New York City students to isolate the
uncompensated peer effects of disabled students. I classify students as “disabled” if they
are ever observed in special education between grades 4 and 7. This allows me to examine
1In Texas, Hanushek et al. (2002) find a positive relationship between a high percentage of special educa-
tion peers and the academic achievement of regular education students, while, in British Columbia, Friesen
et al. (2010) find a negative, small, and mostly insignificant relationship. Friesen et al. (2010) suggest that
the difference in results may be due to differences between the funding mechanisms in Texas and British
Columbia; although school districts in Texas receive additional funds for each special education student,
school districts in British Columbia receive funds which are proportional to student enrollment (assuming a
constant proportion of students have disabilities) to treat mild disabilities. British Columbia does provide
additional funds for severely disabled students.
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the peer effects of “disabled” students who do not receive special education services, either
because they are “undiagnosed” and have not yet entered special education, or because
they have been “declassified” and have exited special education. I identify the effects of
these disabled students — when they are and are not receiving special education services
— on their non-disabled peers by using variations in peer composition between cohorts in
the same school and grade. Like Hanushek et al. (2002) and Friesen et al. (2010), I find
that disabled students who receive special education do not harm the achievement of their
non-disabled peers. However, these benign results mask the negative effect disabled students
would have in the absence of special education services. Disabled students who do not receive
special education services, particularly those with undiagnosed disabilities, have a significant
negative effect on their non-disabled peers. The estimates imply that if one non-disabled
student in a grade of 75 students were replaced by a student with an undiagnosed disability,
the exam scores of the 74 non-disabled students would be expected to fall by 0.6% of a
standard deviation in math and English.2
One explanation for these negative peer effects is that, along the lines of Lazear (2001),
disabled students are more disruptive in class. Consistent with this notion, not only are
students with undiagnosed disabilities more likely to be suspended, but they also raise the
probability of suspension for their non-disabled peers. I also find that having an experienced
teacher lessens the negative effects of students with undiagnosed disabilities, consistent with
the notion that effective teachers may be able to limit the extent of disruptions in their class-
rooms. Finally, I find that segregation may be one of the main mechanisms through which
special education mitigates the effects of disabled peers, although special education may also
improve the classroom environment by providing other inputs, such as counseling/tutoring
for disabled students or a teacher’s aide (Hanushek et al. 2003; Cohen 2008).
2Each student has 74 peers, so each non-disabled student’s score is reduced by 0.6% in math (1/74 ×
−0.4579× 100%) and 0.7% in English (1/74×−0.4879× 100%).
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I perform a number of robustness checks to ensure the results are not driven by selec-
tion. I find no evidence of negative selection among the peers of students with undiagnosed
disabilities, and the results are relatively robust to the use of within school-year and within
individual variation in peer group composition. There is also no evidence that the results
are being driven by temporary negative shocks which cause some students to be classified as
disabled and temporarily reduce the achievement of non-disabled peers; these shocks would
generate correlations between the outcomes and timing of diagnosis which are not supported
by the data.
These findings have important implications for education policy. First, they are relevant
to the concern that disproportionate spending on special education drains resources from
regular education; in 2000, the cost of educating the 13.2% of students who received special
education services was $77.3 billion and accounted for 21% of spending on elementary and
secondary education services (U.S. Office of Special Education Programs 2007; Chambers et
al. 2004). Of course, disproportionate spending may be warranted if it generates positive
spillovers for regular students, in addition to benefiting disabled students. An approximate
dollar value of the benefit to regular students can be calculated from estimates of test score
gains to non-disabled students and the labor market value of test score gains. A conservative
estimate from Kane and Staiger (2002) is that a one standard deviation increase in math
test scores is worth around $90,000 at age 9. This estimate implies that the receipt of
special education by 13.2% of students yields math test gains of 0.06 standard deviations
for each regular student, and with 40.9 million regular students, the test score gains alone
are worth $220 billion, far surpassing the $77.3 billion cost of educating special education
students. Second, as these gains may largely result from segregating disabled students, these
findings suggest that peer effects should figure into the cost-benefit calculus of policies that
mainstream special education students.
This paper continues as follows: Section 2.2 provides background information on special
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education and peer effects. Section 2.3 presents the empirical strategy. Section 2.4 describes
the data. Section 2.5 discusses the results, Section 2.6 presents robustness checks, and
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Special Education in New York City
In 1975, the United States federal government enacted the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1990.
The purpose of IDEA was to ensure that states and localities provided early intervention,
special education, and related services to children with disabilities. Prior to the passage of
IDEA, U.S. schools educated only about 20% of students with disabilities, and many states
excluded children who were deaf, blind, emotionally disturbed, or mentally retarded from
the education system entirely (U.S. Office of Special Education Programs 2007).
As seen in Figure 2.1, in the 30 years since the passage of IDEA, the percentage of
students receiving special education services has increased substantially, from 8.3% in 1977
to 13.5% in 2007. Some explanations for this increase are expanded cultural norms about
what constitutes disability, increased take-up due to reduced stigma, and increased childhood
poverty (Cullen 2003). However, since much of this increase occurred for “specific learning
disabilities,” which have more subjective diagnostic criteria than other disabilities (e.g.,
mental retardation), there have been concerns that schools are increasingly misclassifying
students as disabled in response to fiscal and school accountability incentives. For example,
Cullen (2003) finds that fiscal incentives explain about 40% of the growth in student disability
rates in Texas. Figlio and Getzler (2002) find that the introduction of high-stakes testing and
test-based school accountability systems in Florida led schools to classify students as disabled
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and, thus, exempt from testing. Jacob (2005) and Cullen and Reback (2006) document
similar phenomena in Chicago and Texas, respectively.
Although these papers suggest that schools may strategically classify students as disabled
in response to incentives, there is a rigorous evaluation process which determines special edu-
cation placement and services. In New York City, the process begins when a teacher, parent,
or clinician refers the child for an evaluation. After the referral, a school psychologist admin-
isters a battery of tests to measure the child’s “reasoning, motor skills, language, executive
functions, visuo-spatial skills, social/emotional and behavioral functioning, memory, [and]
academic achievement in reading, mathematics, written expression, and oral communica-
tion” (Wernikoff 2007; conversations with NYC special education teacher).3 The results of
these tests are used in conjunction with student records, classroom based assessments, ob-
servations of student behavior, and interviews with the student, school staff, and parents to
determine eligibility. A student is eligible for special education services if his School Based
Support Team (SBST), which includes his parents, a regular education teacher, a special ed-
ucation teacher, and a district representative, determines that he meets the criteria for one
or more of New York State’s disability classifications and requires special education services
to benefit from instruction.4
For example, prior to the reauthorization of IDEA in 2004, the criteria for being diagnosed
with a “learning disability” (LD) was that the student must “[exhibit] a discrepancy of 50
percent or more between expected achievement and actual achievement” (Board of Education
of the City of New York n.d.). Due to concerns that the discrepancy requirement resulted in
late identification and misidentification of LD, the reauthorization eliminates the discrepancy
requirement but requires schools to document responsiveness to intervention (Cortiella 2010).
3For example, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) and Wechsler Individual Achievement
Test (WIAT).
4A school psychologist, school social worker, and/or physician may also participate.
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If the student is eligible for special education services, the SBST must also develop an
Individualized Education Plan (IEP) that establishes goals for the student and specifies what
environment and services the student needs to meet those goals. The IEP and placement are
reviewed by the SBST annually and a reevaluation is conducted at least every three years.
If the SBST determines the student no longer requires special education services, it may still
arrange services for the student for up to one year following declassification.
IDEA mandates that special education students be educated in the “least restrictive
environment,” that is, “to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities...are
educated with children who are not disabled.” Special classes, separate schooling, or other
removal from the regular educational environment should only occur when education in
regular classes with supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved due to nature or
severity of a child’s disability (Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
2004). However, the extent to which this is followed in practice is uncertain; numerous
lawsuits have been filed by parents alleging that their children have not been placed in the
least restrictive environment (Crockett and Kauffman 1999).
Special education students who are educated in the general education environment re-
ceive supplementary aids and services, such as curriculum modification, speech/language
therapy, or a paraprofessional assigned to the classroom (e.g., teacher’s aide). In New York
City, regular and special education students are sometimes taught together by one general
education and one special education teacher in “collaborative team teaching” classrooms.5
Other special education students are taught in self-contained classrooms in general education
schools. Students diagnosed with moderate to severe disabilities, such as autism spectrum,
severely emotionally challenged, and/or multiply disabled attend schools in District 75, the
Special Education District.




Identifying the effects of disabled students on their regular education peers is complicated
by a few well-known identification problems. The first is the selection problem: students (or
students’ parents) may select peer groups based on unobservables which are correlated with
the outcome measures. A number of studies avoid selection bias in estimates of peer effects
by exploiting knowledge of the assignment rule or quasi-experimental designs (Sacerdote
2001; Zimmerman 2003; Angrist and Lang 2004; Hoxby and Weingarth 2005; Lehrer and
Ding 2007; Imberman et al. 2009).
However, since this type of variation is not always available, other methods have been
used to address selection bias. Hoxby (2000) and Hanushek et al. (2003) identify peer effects
using variation between cohorts within a grade within a school. This strategy, which is also
used in this paper, relies upon the fact that even when parents make school choices based on
the achievement or demographic composition of schools’ past cohorts, the actual achievement
or composition of their child’s cohort may deviate from their expectations. Moreover, once
parents have chosen a school, it may be costly for them to change in response to unanticipated
deviations. Using variation at the grade level, rather than at the classroom level, further
removes selection bias due to non-random sorting of students across classrooms within a
grade (e.g., schools tracking students by achievement or highly motivated parents pressuring
principals to put their children in a particular teacher’s class).
The second problem is reflection or simultaneity: a student both affects and is affected
by her peers (Manski 1993; Moffit 2001). While this is not a problem for studies which
look at the effect of peer demographic characteristics, it is an significant obstacle for studies
that want to examine the effect of peers’ achievement on students’ own achievement. To
address this problem, studies generally use the lagged outcomes (e.g., test scores, GPA) of
peers as measures of peer achievement. When peer groups are composed of students who
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have not previously been peers, simultaneity bias is eliminated. For example, Sacerdote
(2001), Zimmerman (2003), and Lehrer and Ding (2007) look at college or high school peer
groups that are composed of students from many different high schools or middle schools, and
Imberman et al. (2009) study peer groups formed due to hurricane evacuations. However,
when students remain peers as they progress through school, their lagged scores are also
likely biased due to simultaneity.
While the literature provides substantial evidence for the existence of peer effects, un-
derstanding the mechanisms through which they operate is critical for understanding how
to address them. A number of papers show that peer effects operate through behavior prob-
lems (e.g., Figlio 2007; Aizer 2008; Lavy et al. 2008; Fletcher 2009; Imberman et al. 2009;
Carrell and Hoekstra 2010). Two of these papers focus on students who may have disabil-
ities: Fletcher (2009) observes lower test scores among classmates of severely emotionally
disturbed students, while Aizer (2008) finds that having a classmate with undiagnosed At-
tention Deficit Disorder (ADD) reduces test scores.6 If children who disrupt the class reduce
the ability of other students to learn, Lazear’s (2001) theoretical model of peer effects shows
that, in some cases, the segregation of more disruptive students is efficient.7 On the other
hand, Aizer (2008) finds that diagnosis and treatment of ADD mitigates negative externali-
ties without classroom reassignment.
Peer effects may also operate through changes in teacher behavior. Duflo et al. (2010)
provide evidence from a randomized evaluation in Kenya that tracking students by prior
achievement benefits all students, which they attribute this to teachers being better able
to tailor instruction in more homogeneous classes. Other studies of tracking provide more
6Emotional disturbance and other health impairment, which includes ADD when it adversely affects a
student’s performance, are considered disabilities under IDEA (Department of Education 1999).
7This assumes that students’ propensity to be disruptive is independent of their peers’ propensity to be
disruptive. Integration may be efficient if integration can transform disruptive students into non-disruptive
students.
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mixed results (e.g., Betts and Shkolnik 1999; Figlio and Page 2002; Zimmer 2003; Lefgren
2004).
Either of these mechanisms could explain negative peer effects of disabled students; dis-
abled students may cause more disruptions than non-disabled students, or they may require
additional time to understand the subject material, slowing down the pace of the class. Spe-
cial education may compensate for negative peer effects in a number of ways. It provides
additional resources to disabled students who remain in the same class and facilitates track-
ing by funding smaller, separate classes for disabled students. Resources, such as tailored
instruction or counseling, may improve the achievement or behavior of disabled students
who remain in the same class, while disabled students who attend separate classes or schools
should have no direct effect on non-disabled students.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
To examine the peer effects of disabled students, I estimate the following specification for
non-disabled students:
Yigst = Xigstβ + P−igstθ +Dgstγ + µgs + νgt + igst (2.1)
where Yigst is the outcome variable (i.e., math test score, English test score, or probability
of suspension) for student i in grade g, school s, and year t, and Xigst is a vector of student
level covariates, including indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, free lunch status, English
Language Learner status, whether the student is repeating the grade, and whether the stu-
dent has switched schools in the previous year.8 P−igst is a vector of the characteristics
of student i’s school-grade peers, including the proportions of peers, excluding i, who are
8Math and English test scores have both been standardized to have a mean 0 and standard deviation 1
for each year and grade.
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female, black, Hispanic, other non-white race, receiving free lunch, and English Language
Learners. The vector Dgst contains the variables of interest: the proportion of peers who are
disabled and receive special education services, the proportion of peers who have undiag-
nosed disabilities, and the proportion of peers who are disabled but have been declassified.
Thus, the coefficients in γ test whether disabled students who do and do not receive special
education services have negative peer effects. Finally, µgs is a school-grade fixed effect, νgt is
a year-grade fixed effect, and igst is the error term.
9 To account for intra-school correlations
between students’ test scores, the standard errors are clustered by school.
This specification will produce unbiased estimates if the remaining variation in the pro-
portion of disabled students between cohorts in the same grade and school is exogenous to
the sorting of students across schools. This assumption would fail if there were unobserved
time-varying factors that were correlated both with the proportion of disabled students and
the achievement of students’ peers (e.g., if an increase in school resources increased diagnosis
of disabled students and improved the achievement of non-disabled peers). To address this
concern, I perform a number of robustness checks and find no evidence that the results are
being driven by selection bias.
Because students’ disability/special education status is unlikely to be affected by their
peers, the reflection problem is less of a concern in this context, especially compared to studies
which use the lagged test scores of students’ peers. However, the reflection problem could still
be relevant if having low achieving peers causes students to be diagnosed as disabled (e.g.,
if students are diagnosed as disabled because they perform poorly, and they perform poorly
primarily because they have low achieving non-disabled peers). Yet, poor performance on
the standardized exams is not sufficient for a positive diagnosis; as previously explained, the
9I include school-grade rather than school fixed effects because spurious correlations might arise if age-
specific trends in student achievement and disability classification vary by schools. For example, at a high
poverty school, a spurious correlation could be produced by the following unrelated trends: student achieve-
ment decreases as students approach adolescence and the number of students classified as disabled increases.
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School Based Support Team bases its determination of disability on tests administered by a
school psychologist and other measures of the student’s behavior and ability, not solely the
student’s standardized exam scores.
A related concern over the subjectivity of diagnosis is that schools could misclassify
disruptive students as disabled in order to reduce their negative peer effects. While this is
possible, these misclassifications would still have to make it through the evaluation process;
school staff can refer students for evaluation, but students would have to be evaluated and
determined to have a disability by the School Based Support Team, which includes students’
parents. Moreover, even if such misclassifications occur, this type of manipulation is not a
reflection problem but does change the interpretation of these results. In this case, special
education is an intervention which mitigates the negative peer effects of disruptive (non-
disabled) students.
2.4 Data
This paper uses a rich panel data set from New York City to follow seven cohorts of students
as they progress from 4th through 7th grade. The oldest cohort attended 4th grade in school
year 1999-2000, while the youngest cohort attended 4th grade in school year 2005-2006. Each
cohort contains around 80,000 students in 1,000 schools.
The data contain information on students’ math and English exam scores, suspensions,
gender, race/ethnicity, free lunch eligibility, and English Language Learner status. Impor-
tantly, the data contain students’ special education status but not their type of disability.
Students are also matched to their schools, and in most cases, to their classrooms and teach-
ers.10
10Some schools did not use the administrative system which allows linkages between teachers and students,
and older students, who are taught by separate math and ELA teachers, are less likely to be linked. Kane
et al. (2008) find no statistically significant relationship between student characteristics and schools’ use of
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One important limitation of the data is that they contain the grade level of the exam
taken by students but not students’ grade level. I assume that students take the appropriate
grade level exam and impute grade levels for students who were not tested using the following
method. If a student took exams in previous years, I assume that the student was promoted
from his grade in the previous years, and if a student never took an exam, I use his exact
date of birth and New York’s kindergarten entry date to place him in his age-appropriate
grade.11 Students are restricted to be in highest grade served by their school. Due to concerns
about grade misclassification, I drop the school-grade-year cells with less than 28 students
(the bottom 1% in school-grade enrollment) from the regression sample. I also drop a few
non-disabled students who attend schools (e.g., hospital schools) in the Special Education
District, District 75, from the regressions.
The panel structure of the data allows me to observe whether a student has received
special education in the past or will receive it in the future. Since students must have a
disability in order to receive special education services, I exploit the panel structure of the
data to classify students as “disabled” if I ever observe them receiving special education
services between 4th and 7th grade. This classification assumes that students’ disabilities
exist both before and after the student receives special education. This assumption seems
realistic in most cases, such as for a student whose learning disability is not diagnosed until
5th grade, but would not properly account for individuals whose disability status changes
over time, such as a student whose disability is the result of a recent car accident. However,
this type of measurement error would tend to attenuate the estimates.
this administrative system.
11In New York, students must turn 5 before December 31 of their kindergarten year. For regular education
students who took exams, the grade of the exam matches the age-appropriate grade more than 90% of the
time for regular education students and 50% of the time for special education students. While this suggests
that the grades of special education students who do not take exams may tend to be overestimated, they are
a small fraction of the special education population (see Table 2.1).
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Since students are classified as disabled based upon their past, present, and future receipt
of special education services, some disabled students do not currently receive special educa-
tion services. I classify students as “undiagnosed” if they receive special education services
in the future and as “ declassified” if they received special education services in the past.
Table 2.1 presents statistics by grade on the prevalence of disability, the receipt of special
education services, and exam participation among the New York City students in the sample.
Overall, I classify 11 percent of students as disabled, but only 9.3% of students receive special
education services. As students progress through grades, the percentage of students in special
education grows since more students are diagnosed than are declassified.
Panel A of Table 2.1 reports exam participation rates for regular and special education
students in New York City, which are comparable or higher than those in British Columbia
and Texas.12 In Texas, about 80% of regular students have valid gain scores, compared
to 90% in both British Columbia and New York City (Friesen et al. 2010; Hanushek et
al. 2002).13 Exam participation rates for special education students in New York City are
noticeably higher than those in British Columbia and Texas. In British Columbia, only
67% of learning disabled students take exams, and in Texas, only 30% of special education
students have valid gain scores; in New York City, about 80% of special education students
take exams and 70% have valid gain scores (Friesen et al. 2008; Hanushek et al. 2002).
Panel B of Table 2.1 presents statistics on the fraction of disabled students who are
undiagnosed, receiving special education services, and declassified. Most disabled students
receive special education services in all years. Due to the window of observation, most of
12Some English Language Learners receive exemptions; thus, participation rates are lower for ELA than for
math. Some special education students are exempt from these exams and may receive alternate assessments,
but these exemptions seem to be limited to students with the most severe disabilities; about 95% of the
special education students who do not take exams received special education services in all the years they
were in the sample.
13In order to have a valid gain score, students must have non-missing exam scores for two consecutive
exams.
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the undiagnosed students are in 4th grade, and most of the declassified students are in 7th
grade.14 A quarter of disabled students do not receive special education in 4th grade, and
8% of disabled students are declassified by 7th grade. Note that I identify the effects of
students with the types of disabilities that could remain undiagnosed by the 4th grade; this
rules out more severe disabilities, and the results should be interpreted in this light.
Table 2.2 provides the summary statistics for the non-disabled students used in the re-
gressions, and, for comparison purposes, the summary statistics for disabled students who
also have non-missing suspension outcomes and student and peer controls. The summary
statistics for disabled students are separated into three categories: special education, undi-
agnosed, and declassified. The table shows that, as expected, disabled students have lower
academic achievement than non-disabled students. Since the most severely disabled students
always receive special education services, special education students have the lowest math
and English scores, almost 1.5 standard deviations below those of non-disabled students.
Undiagnosed and declassified students fare better but still score about 1 and 0.5 standard
deviations lower than non-disabled students, respectively. These summary statistics also
suggest that disabled students may be more disruptive; while the overall rates of suspension
are relatively low, less than 3% for non-disabled students, suspension rates are twice as high
for special education and declassified students, and over three times higher for undiagnosed
students. Disabled students also tend to be male, are disproportionately black and Hispanic
minorities, and are more likely to receive free lunch and English Language Learner services.
Table 2.2 also reports the characteristics of students’ peers in their school and grade.
About 7% of the peers of non-disabled students receive special education services, 1.6%
have undiagnosed disabilities, and 0.4% have been declassified. Compared to non-disabled
students, undiagnosed and declassified students are only slightly more likely to have spe-
14The small percentage of students in 7th grade who are undiagnosed are due to students who have
repeated 7th grade.
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cial education peers; about 8% and 9% of their peers receive special education services,
respectively. In contrast, 13% of the peers of special education students also receive special
education services. Since receipt of special education services is correlated with other stu-
dent characteristics, disabled students’ peers are also more likely to be black or Hispanic and
receive free lunch.
2.5 Results
Table 2.3 presents the effects of disabled peers on non-disabled students’ math and English
test scores (Columns 1-6) and probability of suspension (Columns 7-9). All specifications in-
clude student controls, controls for other peer characteristics, school-grade fixed effects, and
year-grade fixed effects. The first specification is similar to those in Hanushek et al. (2002)
and Friesen et al. (2010), who only examine the peer effects of special education students.
The estimated effects of special education peers on non-disabled students’ math and En-
glish scores are small and insignificant; the point estimates of -0.04 standard deviations for
math (Column 1) and 0.02 standard deviations for English (Column 4), fall between the
statistically significant 0.16 effect found by Hanushek et al. (2002) and the statistically in-
significant -0.14 effect found by Friesen et al. (2010). However, the next specification shows
that these results mask the effect that disabled students have on their peers’ test scores in
the absence of special education services (Columns 2 and 5). The final specification sepa-
rates disabled peers not receiving special education services into two categories, those who
are undiagnosed and those who are declassified, and shows that the negative effects on test
scores are driven almost entirely by peers with undiagnosed disabilities (Columns 3 and 6).
The results for suspension are similar: while special education students do not significantly
affect the probability of suspension (Column 7), having more peers with undiagnosed dis-
abilities significantly raises it (Column 9). Overall, the results imply that a one standard
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deviation increase in the proportion of peers with undiagnosed disabilities (about 2%) would
reduce non-disabled students’ exam scores by nearly 1% of a standard deviation in math
and English and increase their probability of suspension by 0.09%. Peers who have been
declassified have no significant effects on non-disabled students, probably because disabled
students who no longer require special education services are positively selected.
Since schools may respond to high proportions of special education students by hiring
better teachers, Table 2.4 examines whether teacher quality can explain the absence of
significant peer effects for special education students. Teacher quality could also explain the
negative effects of students with undiagnosed disabilities if lower quality teaching caused
students to be classified as disabled and also reduced the test scores of their non-disabled
peers.15 Since I am missing classroom and teacher identifiers for some students, I restrict
my analysis to the subsample of students with non-missing classroom and teacher identifiers
and, using this subsample, reproduce the main results (Columns 1, 4, and 7). The next
specification adds a control for teacher quality: the proportion of teachers in the school-
grade-year cell with no prior teaching experience (Columns 2, 5, and 8).16 As expected,
the estimates suggest that inexperienced teachers are significantly worse than experienced
ones. If one of three teachers in the grade is replaced with a novice, students’ average scores
will decrease by about 2% of a standard deviation. However, while teacher experience is
important, it does not explain either the lack of effect of special education students or the
negative effect of undiagnosed students.17 The final specification tests the suggestion of
Lazear (2001) that high quality teachers are better able to control disruptive students by
15However, IDEA specifies that children should not be classified as disabled due to lack of appropriate
instruction in math or reading.
16Teacher experience has a positive effect on student learning, but these effects are mainly concentrated
in the first year of teaching (Hanushek and Rivkin 2006).
17Hanushek et al. (2002) also find that teacher experience does not explain the positive effect of special
education students on their peers.
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including interactions between the teacher experience variable and the proportions of disabled
peers. The interaction between undiagnosed peers and the proportion of novice teachers is
large and negative for math and English test scores and positive for suspensions, although
it is only statistically significant for math. Nevertheless, these results provide suggestive
evidence that more experienced teachers may be better at mitigating negative peer effects
than inexperienced teachers, possibly because they are better able to minimize disruptions.
Non-disabled students may also benefit if disabled students are educated in separate
classrooms, as are the majority of special education students in New York City. Even
excluding the special education only schools in District 75, about 78% of special education
students attend special education only classes in math or reading. While students who
enter or exit special education are more likely to be mainstreamed, only 32% of them attend
general education classes when they receive special education services. I take two approaches
to determine whether the segregation explains why students with undiagnosed disabilities
have a negative effect on their peers, but special education students do not. First, I use
classroom identifiers to determine the following proportions of school-grade peers: (1) the
proportion who have undiagnosed disabilities and will be placed in special education only
classes in the future, (2) the proportion currently attending special education only classes,
and (3) the proportion who have been declassified but attended special education only classes
in the past. In Table 2.5, I use the same subsample of students as Table 2.4 and include
(1) through (3) as additional regressors in the main specifications (Columns 1, 3, and 5).
The coefficients on (1) through (3) test whether disabled students who are ever segregated
have different effects than those who are not.18 The estimates suggest that disabled students
who are ever segregated tend to have more negative peer effects than those who are not.
18Because I am missing classroom identifiers for some schools, primarily middle schools, I may understate
the proportion of disabled students ever in special education only classes, which would tend to bias these
estimates towards 0.
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In math, the negative effect of students with undiagnosed disabilities comes almost entirely
from students who will be placed in special education only classes, but the interaction is not
statistically significant for English test scores or suspensions. Special education students who
attend separate classes have more positive effects on test scores and more negative effects on
suspensions, although these coefficients are imprecisely estimated. Declassified students who
previously attended separate classes have negative and insignificant effects on test scores,
although they have a significant negative effect on the probability of suspension.
One limitation to the approach of comparing the effects of disabled students who ever and
never attended special education only classes is that it does not account for smaller changes
in the distribution of students between classes. For example, even if all disabled students
were mainstreamed, it might be optimal to educate all the disabled students in a grade at a
school in one classroom, rather than spreading them out among many. In order to analyze
smaller changes in the sorting of students between classes, I follow the racial segregation
literature and construct an index to measure the isolation of the three groups of disabled
students (Bell 1954; White 1986; Cutler et al. 1999). For special education students, the
index of isolation is:












where studentsi and special edi are the numbers of students and special education students
in class i, studentstotal and special edtotal are the total numbers of students and special








) is the proportion of special education students in the
class attended by the average special education student. Note that this sum would equal
1 if all of the special education students in a grade at a school were educated in a single,
segregated class. Subtracting special edtotal
studentstotal
from this sum eliminates the effect that comes
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from the overall proportion of special education students, and dividing by 1 − special edtotal
studentstotal
scales the index to fall between 0 and 1, with 1 representing complete isolation.19 I construct
similar indices for undiagnosed and declassified students by substituting the corresponding
numbers of undiagnosed and declassified students into the equation. The average isolation
indices for special education, undiagnosed, and declassified students are 0.86, 0.34, and 0.65,
respectively. Undiagnosed students are less isolated since their disabilities have not yet been
identified, while declassified students remain somewhat isolated even after they exit special
education.
In Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 2.5, I include these isolation indices in the main speci-
fication along with the proportion of peers in each of these categories. The isolation index
for undiagnosed peers is positive and significant for math and negative and significant for
suspensions, suggesting that holding the proportion of undiagnosed peers fixed, increasing
the isolation of these students reduces negative peer effects. The isolation indices for both
special education students and declassified students are small and insignificant. This may be
because, on average, these students are already more segregated, or because schools inten-
tionally sort students diagnosed with disabilities into classes based on their potential to be
disruptive, such that removing the marginal special education student from the mainstream
may yield smaller gains.
2.6 Robustness Checks
The previous section suggests that unlike disabled students who receive special education
services, students with undiagnosed disabilities have negative effects on their peers. How-
ever, these estimates could be biased if there are unobserved time-varying factors which are
correlated with test scores and with changes in the proportion of students with disabilities.
19The isolation index equals 1 if there are no special education students.
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For example, an increase in drug use in a neighborhood could increase the number of disabled
students and also cause their non-disabled peers to have lower test scores. However, if such
unobservables had permanent effects on a cohort (e.g., if neighborhood drug use increases
the births of children with disabilities and/or low achievement), one would also expect the
proportion of special education students to be negatively correlated with the test scores
of non-disabled peers, which it is not. The next three tables present specifications which
address these concerns.
The first of these, Table 2.6, checks whether the proportions of disabled peers are corre-
lated with observable characteristics of non-disabled students. It reports the coefficients from
the regressions of observable student characteristics on the proportions of disabled students,
peer controls, school-grade fixed effects, and year fixed effects. There are few significant
imbalances, and these are relatively small and not consistently signed. Notably, the evidence
does not suggest that the non-disabled peers of undiagnosed (declassified) students are sys-
tematically more (less) disadvantaged. The non-disabled peers of undiagnosed students are
less likely to receive free lunch, while those of declassified students are less likely to receive
ELL but more likely to repeat grades. For special education students, peers’ receipt of ELL
and free lunch go in the same direction, but the effects are small; a one standard deviation
increase in the proportion of special education students (6%) only decreases ELL and free
lunch receipt by 0.2% and 0.3%, respectively. It is also important to note that all previous
specifications control for these characteristics, and more stringent specifications are reported
in Table 2.7.
The final columns of Table 2.6 address concerns about selection bias due to correlations
between the population of non-disabled test takers and the proportion of special education
students. For example, a correlation between the exam exemptions of low achieving non-
disabled students and the proportion of special education students could generate a spurious
positive relationship between special education peers and the achievement of non-disabled
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students. Columns 9 and 10 show that the only significant correlation between the probability
of being tested and the proportion of disabled peers is for undiagnosed students on the
English exam. Thus, it is unlikely that selection bias accounts for the results; if anything,
increased exemptions for low achieving non-disabled students should bias the English results
towards zero, and the English and math results are very similar, despite the lack of evidence
of selection bias in math. Moreover, the scope for such selection bias appears limited. No
Child Left Behind mandates the testing of 95% of students both overall and within certain
student subgroups, and while there is evidence that other jurisdictions manipulate testing
populations, there is no evidence of this from New York City. For instance, Rockoff and
Turner (2010) find no evidence that New York City schools decreased the testing population
in response to accountability grades.
Table 2.7 employs two additional strategies to allay concerns about bias due to unobserv-
able time-varying factors. The first uses school-year fixed effects to deal with unobservable
school-specific shocks that could be correlated with peer composition and achievement. For
example, an increase in school resources could increase the diagnosis of disabled students and
improve the achievement of non-disabled peers. The second includes student fixed effects
and identifies the effects of changes in the composition of students’ peers within students
over time. Overall, these results are similar.
The final table, Table 2.8, addresses the concern that these results are consistent with
temporary unobservable negative shocks that reduce students’ achievement and cause stu-
dents to be classified as disabled.20 Such a shock could induce a negative correlation between
students with undiagnosed disabilities and the achievement of non-disabled students, and
if it were temporary, the achievement of non-disabled students would recover in the next
year, resulting in zero correlation between special education students and achievement. A
20For example, Carrell and Hoekstra (2010) find that the negative peer effects of children exposed to
domestic violence are primarily driven by children whose parents had not yet reported the violence.
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temporary shock would generate correlations that are strongly dependent on the timing of
diagnosis; if it dissipates in one year, there should only be negative peer effects for students
who were diagnosed in the following year, and there should be significant positive effects for
special education students who were diagnosed in the previous year. However, the tests for
these correlations in Table 2.8 do not support the idea that the results are being driven by
temporary negative shocks.
2.7 Conclusion
Much of the policy debate surrounding special education has centered on its cost and im-
plementation. The cost of special education has caused worry that special education drains
resources from regular education, while the policy of mainstreaming has caused worry that
inclusion of special education students harms the education of regular students (Sutner 1998;
Duff 1999; Coeyman 2002; Needham 2004).
Contrary to the first claim, I find that special education benefits regular students by
compensating for negative peer effects of disabled students. I estimate that a one standard
deviation increase in the proportion of peers with undiagnosed disabilities (about 2%) would
reduce non-disabled students’ exam scores by nearly 1% of a standard deviation in math
and English and increase their probability of suspension by 0.09%. On the other hand, an
increase in peers receiving special education services has no effect on non-disabled students.
Moreover, since these effects are identified using disabled students who enter and exit special
education, it is reasonable to think that students with more severe disabilities would have
even larger negative peer effects in the absence of special education services.
On the other hand, the results also suggest that the second concern is not unfounded. I
find that segregation may be one of the main mechanisms though which special education
mitigates the effects of disabled peers.
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Nevertheless, there are several reasons why these results should not be interpreted as
advocating the segregation of disabled students. First, the results are based only on one
school district, and their external validity is unclear. Second, it may be possible to effectively
address the peer effects of disabled students by providing higher quality inputs. Indeed, I
find evidence that more experienced teachers are better able to limit negative peer effects,
and Aizer (2008) finds that treating students with ADD mitigates negative peer effects
without classroom reassignment. Third, this paper does not study non-disabled students’
social or emotional development; segregation could deny non-disabled students an important
opportunity to gain tolerance and an understanding of people with disabilities. Finally, even
if segregation were efficient, it might not be equitable. Disabled students already have lower
achievement, and segregating them may further reduce their academic achievement and self-
esteem. Thus, while this analysis sheds light on the relationship between special education
and peer effects, further research is necessary to gain a more complete understanding of the
costs and benefits of special education.
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Source: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP), Data Analy-
sis System (DANS) Note: Between 1987 and 2001, data for preschool-aged children were not legally
allowed to be disaggregated by disability type, so for these years, these children are categorized as
“pre-school age with disability.”
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Table 2.1: Student Status and Exam Participation by Grade
Panel A: Special Education Status and Test Participation
% of Students % Taking Math Exam % Taking English Exam
Grade Students Regular Special Ed Regular Special Ed Regular Special Ed
4 577296 91.8 8.2 95.9 82.7 90.6 77.3
5 573444 90.7 9.3 97.3 82.0 92.8 80.5
6 553291 90.3 9.7 98.0 84.1 93.7 83.1
7 551775 90.1 9.9 98.3 83.9 93.6 83.2
All 2255806 90.7 9.3 97.3 83.2 92.6 81.1
Panel B: Special Education and Disability Status
% of Students
Disabled Disabled Disabled Disabled Without SE
Grade With SE Without SE Undiagnosed Declassified
4 11.2 8.2 3.0 3.0 0.0
5 11.6 9.3 2.3 2.1 0.2
6 11.4 9.7 1.7 1.1 0.6
7 10.9 9.9 1.0 0.1 0.9
All 11.3 9.3 2.0 1.6 0.4
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Students by Disability Status
Disabled
Non-Disabled With SE Undiagnosed Declassified
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Math Score 0.15 0.89 -1.33 1.07 -0.98 0.89 -0.41 0.84
Missing Math Score 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.31 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.16
English Score 0.14 0.90 -1.32 0.99 -0.95 0.83 -0.39 0.79
Missing English Score 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.05 0.23
Probability of Suspension 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24
Black 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49
Hispanic 0.39 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50
Other Race 0.14 0.35 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23
Female 0.51 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47
ELL 0.10 0.31 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.34
Free Lunch 0.84 0.37 0.92 0.27 0.92 0.28 0.88 0.33
Repeating Grade 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.23
Switch Schools 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.46 0.18 0.39 0.48 0.50
Percentage of School-Grade Peers
Black 33.1 30.2 37.9 29.2 37.4 30.1 39.4 29.1
Hispanic 39.3 26.9 41.1 25.8 42.9 26.9 41.5 26.3
Other Race 13.3 17.1 9.3 13.4 9.7 14.8 9.1 13.5
Female 49.3 5.3 48.3 5.0 49.2 5.2 48.8 6.3
ELL 11.2 9.7 11.3 9.1 12.0 9.7 11.1 9.7
Free Lunch 84.5 19.7 87.1 17.2 88.7 16.4 86.2 17.0
Disabled with SE 7.2 6.3 12.7 7.7 7.8 7.0 9.2 6.6
Undiagnosed 1.6 2.0 1.6 2.0 3.2 2.9 0.8 1.4
Declassified 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.7 1.9 6.9
N 1957491 166134 34798 7608
Note: Statistics are only presented for the non-disabled students in the regression
sample, and for the purposes of comparison, disabled students who meet the same
sample restrictions. For more information, see the text.
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Table 2.3: Effects of Special Ed/Disabled Students on Non-disabled Peers
Math Scores English Scores Probability of Suspension
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Disabled With SE -0.0392 -0.0513 -0.0532 0.0226 0.0085 0.0075 0.0154 0.0163 0.0167
(0.0483) (0.0487) (0.0486) (0.0401) (0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Disabled Without SE -0.3848** -0.4483** 0.0294
(0.0968) (0.0838) (0.0169)
Undiagnosed -0.4579** -0.4879** 0.0446*
(0.1067) (0.0926) (0.0175)
Declassified -0.0401 -0.2640 -0.0420
(0.2154) (0.1844) (0.0556)
N 1920768 1920768 1920768 1821868 1821868 1821868 1957491 1957491 1957491
Note: Specifications control for student characteristics, peer characteristics, school-grade fixed effects, and year-grade fixed
effects. Standard Errors are clustered by school. Significance levels are *0.05 **0.01
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Table 2.4: Teacher Experience and Peer Effects
Math Scores English Scores Probability of Suspension
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Disabled With SE -0.0519 -0.0516 -0.0351 0.0071 0.0082 0.0251 0.0104 0.0103 0.0118
(0.0497) (0.0492) (0.0499) (0.0404) (0.0400) (0.0401) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0097)
Undiagnosed -0.4737** -0.4664** -0.3787** -0.5085** -0.5045** -0.4651** 0.0483** 0.0480** 0.0363
(0.1084) (0.1082) (0.1143) (0.0964) (0.0965) (0.1032) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0201)
Declassified 0.0140 0.0094 -0.0656 -0.2804 -0.2789 -0.2991 -0.0372 -0.0372 -0.0531
(0.2567) (0.2560) (0.2762) (0.2257) (0.2245) (0.2354) (0.0689) (0.0689) (0.0743)
Proportion Novice -0.0724** -0.0458** -0.0574** -0.0379* 0.0038 0.0021
(0.0104) (0.0174) (0.0090) (0.0161) (0.0022) (0.0035)
Special Ed*Novice -0.1639 -0.1604 -0.0139
(0.1252) (0.1131) (0.0296)
Undiagnosed*Novice -0.9885* -0.4343 0.1315
(0.4466) (0.3994) (0.0984)
Declassified*Novice 0.5853 0.1379 0.1331
(0.7809) (0.6408) (0.2437)
N 1866220 1866220 1866220 1769117 1769117 1769117 1901608 1901608 1901608
Note: Specifications control for student characteristics, peer characteristics, school-grade fixed effects, and year-grade fixed effects.
Standard Errors are clustered by school. Significance levels are *0.05 **0.01
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Table 2.5: Educational Environment and Peer Effects
Math Scores English Scores Probability of Suspension
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disabled with SE -0.0699 -0.0521 -0.0466 0.0108 0.0245 0.0105
(0.0812) (0.0500) (0.0650) (0.0405) (0.0159) (0.0092)
Disabled in SE Only Class 0.0212 0.0712 -0.0197
(0.0857) (0.0695) (0.0172)
SE Isolation Index -0.0018 0.0037 0.0003
(0.0104) (0.0078) (0.0020)
Undiagnosed -0.0366 -0.3844** -0.3061* -0.4406** 0.0504 0.0316
(0.1644) (0.1145) (0.1467) (0.1004) (0.0258) (0.0197)
Undiagnosed and will be in SE Only Class -0.7910** -0.3648 -0.0035
(0.2355) (0.2032) (0.0411)
Undiagnosed Isolation Index 0.0111* 0.0082 -0.0021*
(0.0050) (0.0043) (0.0010)
Declassified 0.0803 0.1868 -0.0559 -0.0924 0.1275 0.0273
(0.3944) (0.3274) (0.3624) (0.2758) (0.1013) (0.0847)
Declassified and was in SE Only Class -0.0897 -0.3592 -0.2770*
(0.5648) (0.4934) (0.1392)
Declassified Isolation Index 0.0049 0.0052 0.0019
(0.0058) (0.0050) (0.0013)
N 1866220 1866220 1769117 1769117 1901608 1901608
Note: Specifications control for student characteristics, peer characteristics, school-grade fixed effects
and year-grade fixed effects. Standard Errors are clustered by school. Significance levels are *0.05 **0.01
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Table 2.6: Balancing Tests for the Proportion of Special Ed/Disabled Peers
Other Free Repeating Switch Missing Missing
Black Hispanic Race Female ELL Lunch Grade Schools Math Score English Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Disabled -0.0063 -0.0077 0.0022 -0.0273 -0.0407** -0.0474** 0.0023 -0.0277 -0.0099 -0.0108
With SE (0.0124) (0.0142) (0.0076) (0.0159) (0.0097) (0.0053) (0.0063) (0.0223) (0.0076) (0.0094)
Undiagnosed -0.0005 0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0088 0.0335 -0.0403** 0.0165 -0.0278 0.0025 0.0843**
(0.0296) (0.0340) (0.0174) (0.0441) (0.0204) (0.0098) (0.0155) (0.0342) (0.0254) (0.0293)
Declassified 0.0350 -0.0180 0.0168 0.0144 -0.0915* -0.0350 0.0752* 0.3943 0.0169 0.0316
(0.0667) (0.0692) (0.0374) (0.0783) (0.0422) (0.0260) (0.0375) (0.2021) (0.0344) (0.0481)
N 1957491 1957491 1957491 1957491 1957491 1957491 1957491 1957491 1957491 1957491
Specifications control for peer controls, school-grade fixed effects, and year-grade fixed effects. Standard Errors are clustered by
school. Significance levels are *0.05 **0.01
Table 2.7: Robustness Checks
Math Scores English Scores Probability of Suspension
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Disabled With SE -0.0532 0.0647 -0.0279 0.0075 0.0874* 0.0075 0.0167 0.0030 0.0226*
(0.0486) (0.0506) (0.0329) (0.0404) (0.0429) (0.0272) (0.0091) (0.0076) (0.0102)
Undiagnosed -0.4579** -0.3582** -0.2658** -0.4879** -0.2890** -0.2524** 0.0446* 0.0035 0.0449*
(0.1067) (0.1210) (0.0844) (0.0926) (0.1111) (0.0777) (0.0175) (0.0196) (0.0211)
Declassified -0.0401 -0.0209 0.1107 -0.2640 0.0090 -0.2052 -0.0420 -0.0028 -0.0074
(0.2154) (0.2920) (0.1851) (0.1844) (0.2532) (0.1410) (0.0556) (0.0460) (0.0549)
School-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Individual FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
N 1920768 1920768 1920768 1821868 1821868 1821868 1957491 1957491 1957491
Note: Specifications control for student characteristics, peer characteristics, school-grade fixed effects and year-grade fixed
effects.Standard Errors are clustered by school. Significance levels are *0.05 **0.01
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Table 2.8: Timing of Diagnosis and Peer Effects
Probability of
Math Scores English Scores Suspension
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disabled With SE -0.0532 0.0075 0.0167
(0.0486) (0.0404) (0.0091)
Disabled With SE - Diagnosed Before Last Year -0.0607 0.0024 0.0107
(0.0509) (0.0419) (0.0098)
Disabled With SE - Diagnosed Last Year 0.0056 0.0407 0.0721
(0.1295) (0.1156) (0.0409)
Undiagnosed -0.4579** -0.4879** 0.0446*
(0.1067) (0.0926) (0.0175)
Undiagnosed - Diagnosed After Next Year -0.6347** -0.7061** 0.0262
(0.1463) (0.1397) (0.0231)
Undiagnosed - Diagnosed Next Year -0.2944* -0.2888* 0.0628*
(0.1365) (0.1136) (0.0249)
Declassified -0.0401 -0.0299 -0.2640 -0.2552 -0.0420 -0.0362
(0.2154) (0.2155) (0.1844) (0.1846) (0.0556) (0.0551)
N 1920768 1920768 1821868 1821868 1957491 1957491
Note: Specifications control for student characteristics, peer characteristics, school-grade fixed effects and year-grade
fixed effects. Standard Errors are clustered by school. Significance levels are *0.05 **0.01
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Chapter 3
Worker Absence and Productivity:
Evidence from Teaching
with Jonah E. Rockoff




There is scant evidence on the productivity losses from worker absence, despite the fact
that absenteeism results in an annual loss of two percent of work time in the U.S. (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2008). Several highly regarded studies in economics have documented
drops in productivity during labor disputes (Kleiner, Leonard, and Pilarski (2002), Krueger
and Mas (2004), and Mas (2008)), but labor disputes are rare — accounting for just one
one-hundredth of a percent of lost work time — and it is unclear how these results generalize
to more common sources of worker absence, such as illness or personal business.1
In this paper, we present evidence on the impact of absenteeism on productivity using
detailed panel data on the timing, duration, and causes of absences among teachers and the
gains in academic achievement made by their students.2 We take advantage of this data in
several ways to address the endogeneity of absenteeism. First, we base our identification on
variation within teachers over time to avoid bias from the correlation of absenteeism with
persistent differences in productivity across teachers. Indeed, the richness of our data allows
us to identify the impact of absences using variation within the same teacher, school, and
grade level. Second, we contrast estimates of the impact of absences that occur prior to
student exams with those that occur afterwards ; only the former can have a direct causal
impact on our productivity measure. In these respects, our approach is similar to Mas and
1In addition, labor disputes involve more than just the replacement of full-time employees with temporary
workers and are likely to have important effects on employee morale and effort. For example, Krueger and
Mas (2004), who study the production of Bridgestone/Firestone tires, find that defective tires were most
likely to be produced during the period before a major strike (while regular workers were still on the job)
and just before a new contract was settled (when striking employees worked alongside their replacements).
Statistics on the frequency of labor disputes can be found in Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009).
2Economists have used student achievement data extensively to study productivity in teaching, with early
studies by Hanushek (1971) and Murnane (1975) and recent work by Rockoff (2004), Rivkin, Hanushek, and
Kain (2005), and Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007), among others. There is some debate around how
student sorting affects the measurement of teacher productivity (see Kane and Staiger (2008), Rothstein
(2010)). However, our identifying assumptions are much weaker than those needed to identify variation in
quality between teachers, and we present direct evidence against our results being driven by student sorting.
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Moretti (2009); they evaluate peer effects among supermarket cashiers using variation in
productivity within workers over time and exploiting the fact that peers can only directly
affect co-workers’s productivity after they arrive at work. We also use a number of specifi-
cations and robustness checks to confirm that our findings are not driven by teachers taking
more absences when they are assigned more difficult students, or by correlations between
teacher absenteeism and student absenteeism or misbehavior.
Reductions in productivity associated with worker absence in teaching are statistically
and economically significant. These negative effects occur for absences prior to student exams
but not afterwards, supporting a causal interpretation. Our baseline estimates imply that the
average difference in daily productivity between regular teachers and temporary substitutes
is equivalent to replacing a teacher of average productivity with one at the 10th percentile
for math instruction or the 20th percentile for English instruction.3 We also find that
productivity losses from absenteeism are greater for more experienced teachers, consistent
with evidence from various studies that experienced teachers are more productive.
In addition, we provide evidence that daily losses in productivity from worker absence are
decreasing in absence duration. There are several reasons why this might be so. For example,
managers may engage in costly search in order to hire more productive substitute workers
for longer assignments, temporary workers may learn on the job, and the supply of more
productive substitutes may be greater for longer job assignments. Our estimates suggest that
the daily productivity loss when a substitute is used for a single day is even greater than
replacing an average teacher with one at the 1st percentile in math and equivalent to replacing
an average teacher with one at the 3rd percentile in English. In other words, extremely
3Ours is not the first paper to estimate a negative impact of teacher absence on student achievement,
but it is the first to examine variation in absence duration or cause, and the first to exploit the timing of
absences relative to student exams. Miller, Murnane, and Willet (2008) and Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor
(2009) estimate the average effect of teacher absence on student achievement using a teacher fixed effects
approach. Duflo and Hanna (2005) document the negative impact of teacher absences on student achievement
using a randomized control trial in rural India, where substitutes are not used to replace absent teachers.
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little production appears to take place when a teacher is absent for a single day, despite the
presence of a paid temporary substitute. In contrast, the average daily productivity loss from
replacing regular teachers with “long-term” substitutes is equivalent to replacing a teacher
of average productivity with one at the 19th percentile in math and the 20th percentile in
English.
We also investigate variation in the effects of absences with different causes. Indeed, one
concern for our analysis is that shocks to worker health may lower productivity at work in
addition to increasing absenteeism. Despite a large literature on the impact of health on
wages, earnings, labor force participation, and education (Currie and Madrian (1999), Smith
(1999), Currie (2009)), there is little research on the impact of poor health on productivity
at work-what social psychologists have labeled “presenteeism.”4 If worker health shocks
directly affect productivity on the job, we might expect to see outsized impacts of absences
that are related to serious health conditions. However, we find that health and non-health
related absences have very similar negative effects on productivity.
Last, but not least, we examine the importance of absence timing by focusing on the
periods just prior to and during student examinations. We find productivity losses for
absences during periods well before exams, but larger impacts for absences in the weeks
and days leading up to exams. Furthermore, impacts are an order of magnitude greater for
absences on the day(s) students are tested, which we show is likely mediated by the testing
environment, rather than cheating. This analysis indicates that the importance of labor
productivity for specific output measures can vary considerably over the production cycle.
In the production of education, actions taken by teachers just prior to and during exams can
have outsized effects on measured student achievement.
4The literature in social psychology examines cross-sectional variation in self-reported measures of health
and productivity (e.g., Goetzel et al. (2004), Pauly et al. (2008)). In addition, some development economists
have studied health and productivity of agricultural laborers (Strauss and Thomas (1998)).
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 we provide a conceptual framework to
motivate our empirical work. In Section 3.3 we describe the data, and in Section 3.4 we
present our main empirical estimates, robustness checks, and extensions. Section 3.5 offers
some conclusions and discusses the extent to which our findings might generalize to other
contexts.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
We briefly present a conceptual framework that provides empirical predictions and highlights
important issues for our analysis. Consider the productivity of a representative worker r on
a specific day t(qrt) as the sum of ability, work experience, and a stochastic daily component.
In Equation 3.1, we write total production over days indexed from 1 to T as a function of
daily labor productivity for the representative worker r, the productivity of substitute s that
replaces the regular worker when absent, and other production inputs (X).





By assumption, production increases with labor productivity on any day. If expected
productivity is lower for substitute workers than regular workers, increases in absenteeism
should lower production. Also production losses from absenteeism will be greater for more
productive regular workers, all else equal.
In addition, we posit that the expected average productivity of a substitute worker is
increasing in the length of the substitute’s work assignment. There are several reasons to
expect the skill level (ability or experience) of substitutes to be greater for longer jobs:
managers searching for better workers or allocating the best available workers to longer
assignments, more highly skilled workers willing to take a longer assignment (see Gershenson,
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2011), or workers learning on the job. If substitute productivity rises with job assignment
length, then for any two spells of lengths M and N days, M > N , the expected loss from
the M day spell should be less than M/N times the loss from the N day spell. We test this
hypothesis explicitly in Section 3.4.
Of course, regular workers will choose when to be absent when the benefits (e.g., leisure)
outweigh the costs (e.g., lower pay), and this complicates identification in a regression of
productivity measured over a given period on the number of worker absences. We consider
the net benefits of absence on any given day as determined by three factors: (1) worker-
specific factors that do not vary over time (e.g., tastes for leisure), (2) job characteristics
(including salary) which may change over time, and (3) a stochastic daily component (e.g.,
health) which may persist over time.
Even if substitute workers were, in expectation, equally productive as the workers they
replace, one might find a spurious relationship between absenteeism and production. For
example, more able workers may also derive greater enjoyment from time spent at work,
creating a correlation between the value of leisure and ability, both of which are typically
unobservable. To address this concern, one can compare production for the same worker
across time, and examine how production varies with absenteeism.
A thornier empirical problem is that time-varying elements of productivity and the net
benefits of absence may be correlated. For example, changes in production inputs will affect
productivity and may also make a job less pleasant, causing workers to show up less often.
A similar problem would arise if workers experience persistent negative health shocks and
are less productive on the job, in addition to taking more time off from work. To address
this issue, one could limit comparisons not only to the same worker over time but also to
periods in which absences varied but other factors were held constant. However, there may
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still be bias due to factors which cannot be directly observed.5
To gauge the importance of a number of sources of bias, one can use a placebo test
based on the idea that a worker’s production over a given time period cannot be directly
related to her future absences. Taking any factor that lowers productivity, makes absenteeism
more attractive, and is constant within workers over a set of days 1 to T , we can see that,
conditional on the number of absences between day 1 and day T − K, the unobservable
factor will create a correlation between productivity during days 1 to T − K and increase
absences during days T −K+1 to T . Thus, a relationship between current productivity and
future absenteeism would be evidence of bias: we should observe no relationship between
productivity measures and subsequent absenteeism if the link between productivity and
absenteeism is causal.
Passing such a placebo test is, of course, not proof of causality. Unobservable factors that
are imperfectly correlated across the periods from day 1 to T −K and day T −K + 1 to T
will still hold the potential for bias. While addressing all potential sources of bias in a non-
experimental (or quasi-experimental) setting is quite difficult, one can assess the importance
of many potential biases using detailed data. For example, one issue is that temporary
negative health shocks may cause workers to take more time off and be less productive on
the job. To test for this source of bias, one could compare the productivity effects of health-
related absenteeism to the effects of absences for reasons such as personal business, vacation,
or jury duty. If the health bias exists, one would expect health related absences to appear
more detrimental to productivity.
5One way to address the issue of unobservable factors is to use an instrumental variable for absenteeism.
In developing countries, economists have implemented field experiments which randomized introduction of
financial bonuses for work attendance (Kremer and Chen (2001), Duflo and Hanna (2005)). We lack such
experimental variation. We discuss one potential instrumental variable (inclement weather and commuting
distance) in Section 3.4, but we find it has little power to predict absences in our setting. We therefore rely
on other empirical strategies.
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3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data come from New York City, the largest school district in the U.S., and cover the
school years 1999-2000 through 2008-2009. We focus on teachers of math and English in
grades 4 to 8, who can be linked to students for whom we generally have math and English
test scores in both the current and previous year. Students in elementary grades (4, 5, and
some in grade 6) typically have the same teacher for both subjects, while older students are
taught by two different teachers.6 Over this period, the timing of exams ranged from early
March to mid-May for math and from early January to mid-May for English (Appendix
Table B1). Exam periods lasted from one to three days, followed by a five-day make-up
exam period for students absent during all or part of the regular exam.
In addition to math and English test scores, we have information on students’ absences,
suspensions, demographics, and receipt of free/reduced price lunch (a measure of poverty),
special education for disabled students, and English Language Learner services.7 Data on
teachers’ demographics, graduate education, and experience were obtained from payroll
records.
We have records of the date and reason given for all daily teacher absences over this
time period. The rules governing teacher absences are set forth in a collectively bargained
6Students in grade 6 are taught by the same teacher in schools whose terminal grade is 6. Student-
teacher links were unavailable in some schools at the start of our sample, and we only include students in
school-year cells for which we match greater than 75 percent of students with teachers. Over this period,
students with disabilities were typically taught in separate classrooms or schools and did not take the same
standardized tests as general education students. We therefore exclude all classrooms where the portion of
special education students exceeded 25 percent. We also exclude a few classrooms with less than 7 or greater
than 45 students, where the teacher switches schools during the year, or where the teacher was not on active
duty for more than half the year or until after the exam.
7We unfortunately lack daily information on student absences; we only know each student’s total absences
for the school year. Thus, we are unable to estimate a placebo test for whether students are affected by
the absence of their regular teacher on days when they themselves do not show up at school. We leave this
line of inquiry to future work. While we can test if teacher absences have smaller effects on students who
themselves are absent more often, the correlation of student absenteeism with other characteristics would
make the interpretation of such a test unclear.
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contract between the teachers union (the United Federation of Teachers) and the school
district. Teachers earn ten days of paid absence per school year (one per month). However,
teachers accumulate unused absences, up to a cap of 200 days, and are paid 1/400th of their
most recent salary for each unused absence when they retire. Thus, using “paid” absences
poses a real financial cost for teachers unless they are certain to reach the 200 day cap.8
These rules allow teachers to use up to ten absences each school year for “Self Treated
Sickness” — sick days which do not require proof of illness from a physician — or “Personal
Days.” Teachers can take only three “Personal Days” each year, but there is no barrier to a
teacher labeling an absence for personal business as “Self-treated Sickness.”9 Absences for
“Medically Certified Sickness” (i.e., illness certified by a physician) and several other types
of absences (Conferences/School Activities, Funeral/Death in Family, Jury Duty/Military
Service, Injury, Graduation Attendance, Religious Holiday, and Grace Period) do not count
towards the ten day cap.10 A few absences are Unauthorized.
We also have data on the type, timing, and duration of extended work leaves and job
separations, which we classify into 11 categories: Maternity Leave, Child Care Leave, Medical
Leave, Sick Family Member Leave, Personal Leave, Sabbatical, Resignation or Retirement,
8This constraint is unlikely to bind for the vast majority of teachers. Among all teachers in New York
(not just those teaching math and English in grades 4-8) hired in the school year 1999-2000, more than two
thirds left teaching in the district by the end of our ten year sample, and only three percent of remaining
teachers (1 percent of the cohort) used absences at a rate low enough to reach 200 in 25 years (i.e., 20
absences or less in over ten years).
9The notion that absences for Self Treated Sickness are likely to include many absences not related illness
is supported by absence rates across days of the week. It is reasonable to believe that absences taken for
personal reasons would be more prevalent on Mondays and Fridays, providing workers with a long weekend,
and rates of absence for Self-treated Sickness and Personal Days are both nearly 50 percent higher on
Mondays and Fridays than on Tuesdays through Thursdays. In contrast, absence rates on Tuesdays through
Thursdays are nearly identical to rates for Mondays and Fridays if we examine illnesses certified by a doctor.
Variation in absence by day of the week is not a new finding. High absence rates on Mondays have been
found in studies of absence which go back many decades (e.g., Bezanson et al., 1922), and absences on
Fridays are low in manufacturing jobs where workers are paid in person at the end of each week. In our
setting, teachers’ paychecks are mailed or directly deposited.
10“Grace period” typically applies to teachers who are absent prior to an extended leave (e.g., maternity).
These teachers have exhausted their paid absences and are not paid, and grace period is capped at 30 days.
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Involuntary Termination, Certification Termination, Death, and Other (e.g., unauthorized
leave, military deployment, and leave without pay for various reasons such as working in a
charter school).11 Rules governing extended leaves are also set forth in the union contract,
in accordance with applicable laws such as the Family and Medical Leave Act. Note that
these events can impact students when they end as well as when they begin (e.g., women
beginning their maternity leave in the summer may return several weeks or months after the
school year starts).12
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics on the frequency and duration of spells of absence,
including extended leaves and job separations. Duration is defined by the number of instruc-
tional days (i.e., work days) missed, not calendar days, though the two are highly correlated.
Teachers are absent 10 days on average, or roughly 5 percent of the school year.13 Perfect
11Certification Termination refers to termination of teachers who lacked required credentials; these occur
primarily just before the school year 2003-2004, when state requirements were strictly enforced after a legal
battle between New York City and New York State.
12In about 10 percent of cases, leaves are consecutive (e.g., maternity leave can turn into child care
leave), and we aggregate these into a single leave, using the initial leave to classify the sequence. If daily
absences are followed immediately by an extended leave (e.g., medical leaves are often preceded by absences
for “Medically Certified Sickness” ), we group these together and classify the spell by the extended leave of
absence. In some cases, consecutive daily absences are not all labeled with the same code. In these instances,
we label all absences in the spell under a single code, giving priority to more specific causes, in the following
order: Injury, Medically Certified Sickness, Funeral/Death in Family, Jury Duty/Military Service, Religious
Holiday, Graduation Attendance, Conferences/School Activities, Personal Day, Self-treated Sickness, Grace
Period, and Unauthorized.
13Rates of absence for representative samples of U.S. workers are available from the Current Population
Survey, which asks about time missed from full-time work during a particular week. Rates of absence were
roughly 4 percent in the public sector (3 percent in the private sector) over the time period we analyze.
Although this is somewhat lower than the 5 percent rate in our sample of teachers, CPS rates exclude
vacation and personal days, while a non-trivial fraction of teachers’ ”Self Treated Sickness” absences are
likely taken for personal matters. Comparable data on spells and spell length are not available in the CPS
but are reported in two studies that use daily data on employee absences spanning a long time period. Ichino
and Moretti (2008) report that employee absences for sickness in a large Italian bank last an average of 3.8
days; our figure for Medically Certified Sickness and Medical Leaves is 3.0 days. Barmby, Orme, and Treble
(1991) examine data from a British manufacturing firm in the late 1980s and report mean absence spells of
5 days; like our data, spell length is skewed, with spells of 5 days or less in duration accounting for over 80
percent of spells but 40-45 percent of work days missed. In our data, spells of 5 days or less account for 98
percent of all spells and 78 percent of work days missed. These (admittedly limited) comparisons suggest
that teachers’ spells of absence may tend to be short relative to other sectors and occupations.
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attendance by a teacher occurs in only three percent of cases.
“Self-treated Sickness” accounts for a large portion of all days missed, more than four days
per teacher per year on average, while Medically Certified Sickness and Conferences/School
Activities account for two days and one day, respectively, per teacher per year. The extended
leave that accounts for the most days missed is Medical Leave, which is taken by just over
one percent of teachers per year but has an average duration of almost 43 instructional
days. Other types of extended leave are even less common but have similarly long durations
(e.g., maternity leave is taken by 0.5 percent of teachers and has an average duration of 48.6
days).14
In Table 3.2 we show the mean and standard deviation of absences for the math and
English teachers in our sample, both over the entire school year and broken out by timing:
prior to exams, after exams, during the exam period, and during the make-up exam period.15
As one might guess from the statistics presented in Table 3.1, the distribution of absences is
right-skewed, and the standard deviation of total absences (roughly 10) is quite close to the
mean. We also present standard deviations of residuals from regressions of teacher absences
on teacher-school-grade fixed effects. These “within-teacher” measures are about 65 percent
as large as the standard deviation based on both “between” and “within” variation. This
implies that almost half of the variance in absences among teachers occurs within teachers
across years, providing us considerable identifying variation.16
14To better understand teachers’ potential control over the timing of extended leaves, we have examined
the percentages of each type of event that begin or end during the middle of the school year. Maternity and
Medical Leaves - where we do not expect much control over timing - result in missed work days 90 and 93
percent of the time, respectively, while Personal and Other Leaves - where timing may be partially under
teachers’ control - only result in missed work days 20 and 30 percent of the time, respectively.
15The unit of observation for these tables is a teacher-grade-year cell. We allow for multiple observations
of teachers of multiple grades in the same year since the exam dates differ across grade levels.
16The within-teacher correlation in total days missed across years is just 0.18 in our sample, and there
are very few teachers who do not contribute to identification. Less than 10 percent of teachers observed
in adjacent years did not experience a change in their number of absences; less than 2 percent of teachers
observed to three consecutive years did not experience a change their number of absences.
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Before proceeding to our main analysis, we examine associations between absence fre-
quency and the characteristics of students and teachers using negative binomial regressions.
We find a marginally significant coefficient on students’ prior math test scores, suggesting
that teacher absence — if costly to students — may contribute slightly to inequality in
educational outcomes (Table 3.3). There is no significant relationship between work days
missed and free lunch receipt (our measure of poverty), special education services, or English
language learner services, but we find that teachers of Hispanic students miss fewer days, rel-
ative to teachers of white students. We do find that missed work days are positively related
to student absences, though the coefficient is fairly small.17 Results from negative binomial
regressions of work days missed on a set of teacher characteristics are shown in Table 3.4.
Having a graduate degree is associated with fewer work days missed, as is having few years
of teaching experience. Younger female teachers miss more days of work relative to teachers
of different gender and age categories, and black and Asian teachers miss fewer days relative
to white teachers.
Data on the individuals working as substitute teachers in New York City is unfortunately
unavailable, but we can compare their employment requirements and wages to those of regu-
lar teachers.18 Substitutes in New York do not need to pass state certification requirements
(i.e., possess a degree in education and pass a series of exams) but, like regular teachers,
must have a bachelor’s degree and must pass a criminal background check.19 If a substitute
teacher works for more than 40 days during the school year, they must have certification
17One likely explanation for this finding is correlation between teacher and student illness. Since this could
generate a spurious correlation of teacher absences with student achievement, we estimate specifications that
control for students’ current absences as robustness checks.
18National statistics on substitute teachers are also unavailable; the Bureau of Labor Statistics groups
substitutes with other jobs (e.g., tutor, academic advisor) in the category “Teachers and Instructors, All
Other.”
19Requirements are similar in other parts of the U.S., though Henderson, Protheroe, and Porch (2002)
report that 19 states do not require a bachelor’s degree.
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or complete additional certification coursework before the start of the following school year.
Substitute teachers are currently paid just over $150 per day of work, or about $21 per hour
given the length of a typical school day and about half of what regular teachers earn for
additional hours of work (over $40).
Another important source of substitute teachers in New York City is the Absent Teacher
Reserve (ATR), which consists of certified teachers who lost their jobs due to grade recon-
figuration, reduction in student enrollment, programmatic change, or phase out or closing of
their school. ATR teachers have been unable to find another job, but, in accordance with
the union contract, the school district pays their full salary and they work as substitute
teachers, either on a per-diem or long-term basis. Individual schools using ATR teachers as
substitutes pay 50 percent of the daily wage to the school district, and thus have a financial
incentive relative to using other substitute teachers. A consistent series of statistics on the
size of the ATR is unavailable, but recent reports put the number at around 500 teachers.
Thus, with absence rates of roughly 5 percent and a teaching population of roughly 75,000,
ATR teachers likely cover about 10 to 15 percent of substitute teacher assignments.
3.4 Regression Specifications and Empirical Estimates
We begin by estimating a regression specification of the following form:
Yijkgst = δAjt + βXit + µZkt + λWjt + ρVsgt + pigt + ijkgst (3.2)
where Yijkgst is the exam score of student i, taught by teacher j in classroom k, grade g,
school s and year t. Ajt is the number of work day absences for the student’s teacher, Xit,
Zkt, and Wjt are vectors of, respectively, student, class, and teacher characteristics, Vsgt
is a vector of school-grade-year characteristics, pigt is a grade-year fixed effect, and ijkgst
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is an error term.20 Standard errors are clustered at the school level, which produces more
conservative estimates relative to clustering at the classroom or teacher. Estimates from this
specification suggest that an additional day of work missed by a regular teacher is associated
with a decrease in student test scores of 0.0017 and 0.0006 standard deviations in math and
English, respectively (Table 3.5, Columns 1 and 5).
Our conceptual framework motivates the concern that teachers who frequently miss work
also provide lower quality instruction while on the job. We employ two strategies to address
this issue. First, we separate absences by their timing-before, during, or after student ex-
ams. Since absences after exams cannot have a direct causal relationship with student exam
performance, any observed relationship must be due to endogeneity.21 When we allow the
coefficient on work days missed to differ by their timing relative to student exams (Table 3.5,
Columns 2 and 6), we find much larger negative effects prior to the exam than afterwards.22
The estimated effect of absences prior to the exam is four to five times greater than absences
after the exam, though absences after the exam are marginally significant, suggesting some
bias in our estimates.
We then include teacher-school-grade fixed effects (pijsg in the notation of Equation 3.2.
20Student characteristics include a cubic polynomial in prior year math and English scores, the number
of absences and suspensions in the previous year, and indicators for gender, race and ethnicity, free/reduced
price lunch, special education, and English Language Learner. We also interact all of these variables with
the student’s grade level. Teacher characteristics include indicators for the number of years of teaching
experience (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7+), gender, race, and possession of a graduate degree. School-grade-year and
classroom characteristics include averages of student characteristics and class size.
21A more direct solution to the endogeneity problem would be an instrumental variables approach. We
explored this using an instrument suggested by Miller et al. (2008), the interaction of bad weather with a
teacher’s commuting distance. Unfortunately, the instrument does not have a statistically significant first
stage. Although living more than ten miles away from work has significant power to predict absences on the
actual days of extreme winter weather, it has no power to predict teachers’ total absences prior to exams.
This suggests that teachers who have a long commute do miss work due to bad weather but “make up” that
day some other time. Equivalently, teachers who live close to work and show up in bad weather may “make
up” for it by taking a day off some other time. Using different distance cutoffs (e.g., less than 5 miles or less
than 15 miles) does not change these results.
22The coefficient estimates on absences during the regular exam and make-up exam periods are also
negative and statistically significant. We focus on these results in greater detail in Section 3.4.
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When we control for these time-invariant dimensions of instructional quality (Table 3.5,
Columns 3 and 7), the effects of absences prior to the exam become smaller (-0.0012 and -
0.0006 standard deviations for math and English, respectively) but remain highly significant,
while estimates for absences after the exam are statistically insignificant in addition to being
quite small (roughly -0.0001 standard deviations in both subjects). These results are in
line with a negative causal impact on productivity of replacing a regular teacher with a
temporary substitute. They also indicate that absences are negatively correlated with the
time invariant dimensions of instructional quality captured by the teacher-school-grade fixed
effects.
We test the robustness of these baseline estimates in several ways. First, we drop prior
test scores from our control variable (Xit and Zkt) and put students’ prior test scores as the
dependent variable in our regression. In other words, we test whether teachers are absent
more often in years when they are assigned students with lower prior test scores. Such a
relationship would raise the concern that student sorting might bias our estimates of the
impact of absences. However, we find no significant relationship between absences prior the
exam and students’ prior test scores (Table 3.5, Columns 4 and 8), in contrast to our baseline
results.
As an additional robustness check, we take advantage of the fact that over 90 percent of
middle school students in New York City take math and English with the same classmates,
even though they have different teachers in each subject. If student composition caused
achievement to fall and teacher absences to rise, we might expect the absences of math
teachers prior to the English exam to be correlated with English achievement, and vice
versa.23 In fact, if we omit teacher-school-grade fixed effects, there is indeed a significant
23This result is also evidence against our results being driven by the correlation between teacher and
student absences shown in Table 3.3. If student absences and teacher absences were related due to illness,
we would expect to find effects of English teacher absences on math test scores and vice versa.
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coefficient (-0.00031 standard deviations) for the “effect” of English teachers’ absences prior
to the math exam on math achievement (Table 3.6, Column 1). However, once the fixed
effects are included, this estimate becomes much smaller (-0.00007 standard deviations) and
insignificant (Table 3.6, Column 2). Math teachers’ absences prior to the English exam bear
no relation to English achievement, regardless of the omission or inclusion of fixed effects
(Table 3.6, Columns 3 and 4).24
In further support of the idea that we are estimating causal effects, we have also examined
whether our estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of control variables for student absences
and suspensions in the current school year. Teacher illness could (causally) lead to student
illness (and lower achievement), or vice versa, generating a spurious correlation of absences
with achievement. Students might also misbehave if they think their teacher will be going
away on an extended leave. However, including these control variables has no noticeable im-
pact on our estimates, although students’ own absences and suspensions are both negatively
related to their level of achievement. These results are available upon request.
Having established a strong case for a causal effect of absences on productivity, it is help-
ful to consider the magnitude of these effects. We present a back-of-the-envelope calculation
to give a better sense of the magnitude of the daily productivity loss from having to replace
an absent teacher with a temporary substitute. To do so, we make the simplifying assump-
tion that annual productivity differences across teachers — which are well documented by
economists — are driven by a linear accumulation of differences in daily productivity. This
assumption allows us to estimate the average annual productivity difference between regular
teachers and substitutes by summing the daily difference in productivity (-0.0012 standard
24The estimate for English teachers’ absences on English test scores is smaller here than in our baseline
estimates because our sample is limited to middle school. While the point estimates from our baseline
specification are larger for elementary grades (-0.08) than middle school (-0.03), we cannot reject that they
are the same with a high degree of confidence. For math, estimates for elementary and middle school grades
are quite similar to one another (-0.12).
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deviations in math test scores) over the roughly 130 instructional days prior to the math
exam. Doing so, we arrive at a reduction in math scores of -0.156 standard deviations. We
can then compare this effect to the impact of replacing a regular teacher of average pro-
ductivity with one of lower productivity for the entire school year. Given estimates in the
literature, one would have to replace an average teacher with one at the 10th percentile of
the teacher productivity distribution to get a similar reduction in math scores. In English,
our estimated coefficient on absences (-0.0006 standard deviations) together with a pre-exam
period of 110 instructional days (English exams were typically given prior to math exams)
suggest that replacing a regular teacher with a substitute is, on average, equivalent to replac-
ing an average teacher with one at the 20th percentile.25 Thus, our analysis suggests that
temporary replacements have drastically lower productivity than regular full-time teachers.26
3.4.1 Heterogeneity in Productivity Losses
Our baseline estimates and robustness checks strongly support the notion that productivity
in teaching is significantly lower on days when regular teachers are replaced with temporary
substitutes. However, it is reasonable to think that the impact of absences may be hetero-
geneous. Productivity losses may be greater for absences of highly productive teachers, or,
25To reach this estimate, we take the results from a study by Kane et al. (2008) of teachers in New
York City, though their estimates are similar to other studies in this literature (see Hanushek and Rivkin
(2010)). Kane et al. estimate that math test scores fall by -0.12 standard deviations for a one standard
deviation decrease in teacher productivity. This implies that replacing an average teacher with one at the
10th percentile (1.3 standard deviations below the mean) would reduce scores by -0.156 standard deviations.
Extrapolating our absence coefficient in English (-0.0006) over 110 instructional days implies a reduction in
test scores of -0.066 standard deviations. Kane et al. (2008) find students’ English test scores fall by -0.08
standard deviations for a one standard deviation decrease in teacher productivity. Given this estimate, to
reduce scores by -0.066 standard deviations one would need to replace an average teacher with one at the
20th percentile (0.82 standard deviations below the mean).
26Note that our results are not necessarily informative about what the productivity of individuals working
as substitute teachers might be if they were employed full-time. This is analogous to how studies of labor
unrest (e.g., Krueger and Mas, 2004) examine the productivity of replacement workers under the temporary
conditions in which they are hired, not the productivity they these “scab” workers would have if they received
the same training and support as regular employees.
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alternatively, these teachers may help substitutes provide effective instruction by develop-
ing easy-to-use lesson plans. While we cannot observe productivity directly, several studies
find that teacher productivity rises quickly over the first few years of their careers (Rockoff
(2004), Rivkin et al. (2005), Kane et al. (2008)). We therefore estimate regressions that
allow the impact of teacher absences to differ by whether teachers had less than three years
or three or more years of prior teaching experience.
We find evidence that absences by experienced teachers cause a greater reduction in
student test scores than absences by inexperienced teachers (Table 3.7). The estimated
difference in the impact of absence across the two groups of teachers is highly statistically
significant in math and marginally significant in English (p-value 0.14). Although point
estimates for the impact of absences on student achievement among inexperienced teachers
are still negative, we can no longer reject that they are zero. This provides further support
to the notion that the losses associated with the use of substitute teachers are caused by
their relatively low productivity. In addition to heterogeneity across teachers, the effect
of absences may vary across schools and students. Schools may differ in their abilities to
find good substitutes, and some may provide substitutes with high quality instructional
materials to help reduce the impact of teacher absence. Additionally, Todd and Wolpin
(2003) stress that students and parents may respond to lower instructional quality by shifting
household resources towards education. We do not have measures of how responsive schools
and students are to changes in teacher productivity, but it is not unreasonable to think that
high performing schools and high performing students may be better equipped to deal with
these issues. We therefore estimated regressions that allow the effect of work days missed to
differ across (a) schools with average test scores below and above the citywide median and (b)
students with prior test scores below and above the citywide median. In the latter case, since
students will vary in prior achievement within classrooms, we also estimated specifications
that included classroom fixed effects. We find that the negative effects of work days missed
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are similar across these groups of schools and students in both math and English. These
results are available upon request.
As discussed in Section 3.2, several factors suggest that daily productivity losses may
decline with the duration of a spell of worker absence. In teaching, this could be due to
school principals engaging in costly search for better long-term substitutes, the labor supply
decisions of more highly productive substitute teachers, or temporary substitutes learning
on the job (e.g., learning children’s names and learning styles). To test this hypothesis, we
construct variables that allow us to estimate the daily productivity losses associated with
absences of different durations: 1 day, 2-3 days, 4-5 days, 6-10 days, 11-30 days, and 31 days
or more.27
The results are in line with our hypothesis that daily productivity losses are smaller for
longer duration absences (Table 3.8). In math, the coefficients decline steadily as we move
from single day spells of absence (-0.0036) to spells lasting 31 days or more (-0.0008). In
English, the daily productivity loss from single day spells is again the largest in magnitude
(-0.0017) and then drops off precipitously. The coefficient estimates in English rise slightly
as we move to the longest durations, but we cannot reject that daily productivity losses are
the same for all spells of duration two days or longer.
The variation in magnitude between the estimates for single day absences and those with
long durations is economically important. To illustrate this point, we again use our back-of-
27Let Sitd denote the number of spells of absence of duration d for teacher i in school year t, and define the
number of work days missed during spells lasting d days as Aitd = dSitd. For example, if a teacher has two
five-day absence spells during the school year, then Sit5 would equal 2 and Ait5 would equal 10. Total work
days missed over the school year (Ait) is the sum of the work days missed from spells of a particular duration
over all possible durations (i.e., Ait = Ait1 + Ait2 + · · · + Aitd). Our baseline estimating equation contains
an implicit restriction that the daily productivity loss from worker absence is invariant to absence duration,
and we relax this constraint and allow coefficients on work days missed to vary across several categories of
duration. We report results on effects of absences prior to student exams; we do not find that absences after
exams are related to student achievement, regardless of their duration. In cases where a spell of absence
begins but does not end prior to an exam, the work days missed prior to the exam are grouped according
the duration of the entire spell.
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the-envelope calculation, based on a comparison with variation in productivity across regular
teachers. For absences lasting just a single day, our estimates suggest that the difference
in daily productivity between substitutes and the regular teachers they replace is greater
than the difference between the daily productivity of an average teacher and a teacher at
the 1st percentile in math, and on par with the difference in daily productivity between an
average teacher and one at the 3rd percentile in English. Put differently, it appears that
very little educational production takes place when a regular teacher misses a single day of
work. In contrast, the estimates for the longest spells imply a difference in daily productivity
equivalent to replacing an average teacher with one at the 19th percentile for math and the
20th percentile for English — still an important loss in productivity, but far less severe.
3.4.2 Health and Productivity at Work
In our baseline analysis, we restricted the impact of work days missed to be invariant with
respect to the reason for the teacher’s absence. In many cases, we believe this restriction is
probably correct and, under a strict causal interpretation, is probably warranted: conditional
on duration, the relative productivity of a substitute should be independent of whether the
regular teacher is absent for, say, a funeral or a child’s illness.28 However, teachers may
have health conditions that cause them to be less productive on the job, in addition to
any impact of health on absence from work. This could potentially make health-related
absences appear more detrimental to student achievement than non-health related absences;
essentially, estimates of the impact of health-related absences could suffer from omitted
28Whether the likelihood of absence was known in advance is outside the scope of our analysis, but it
is reasonable to believe that predictable absences might enable teachers or administrators to prepare and
therefore be less costly. While we do not have information on predictability in most cases, we have compared
the impact of maternity leaves — which are clearly known in advance — to medical leaves — which may
be sudden. We find very similar negative impacts of both types of leaves prior to exams and no significant
impacts of either type after the exam, suggesting the negative impact of absenteeism in this setting does not
derive solely from unpredictability.
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variables bias.
To investigate this possibility, we separately examine absences by type, and ask whether
absences that we are confident were due to health conditions — Medically Certified Sickness,
Medical Leave, and Maternity Leave — have outsized effects relative to other absences.29
We find no evidence that health related absences by teachers cause a greater loss in
student achievement than other absences (see Table 3.9). When we estimate separate coef-
ficients on the number of days missed prior to student exams, we actually find smaller point
estimates for health-related absences, particularly for math. However, one problem with
this specification is that health related absences have longer durations, and our previous
results suggest that this would cause them to appear less detrimental. When we allow the
coefficients for health and other absences to differ by duration, we find they both have very
similar magnitudes, and in no case can we reject that they are the same. Thus, we find no
evidence that teachers absent for serious health conditions are also less productive while at
work. While our test for a link between health and on-the-job productivity is admittedly
indirect, it is important to recognize that much of the existing literature on this issue —
very little of it by economists — relies on cross-sectional variation and self-reported health
and productivity measures.
3.4.3 Worker Absences and the Timing of Productivity Measure-
ment
In the empirical results above, we focus on the significant negative impact of absences prior
to student exams, and contrast them with small and insignificant estimates for absences after
the exam period. However, the specifications from which these estimates were taken also
29Absences for Self-treated Sickness may be related to health, but our results are not sensitive to including
them in the non-health-related category or including them as a separate category all to themselves. Our
results are also insensitive to placing absences for maternity leave with the “other” category.
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included controls for teachers’ absences during the time when students were actually taking
exams. In Table 3.10, Columns 1 and 3, we redisplay the results from our baseline regressions,
including the coefficients on the number of absences during the main exam period — which
can last between one and three days — and the five-day make-up period which directly
follows it. In both math and English, absences during the main exam period have significant
negative impacts on achievement (-0.0244 and -0.0128 standard deviations) that are an order
of magnitude greater than the estimated impact of absences in the pre-exam period (-0.0012
and -0.0006 standard deviations). The coefficient for absences during the make-up exam
period is negative and significant in math, but in English is it positive, insignificant, and
quite close to zero.30
The striking results on absences during the main exam period have several possible in-
terpretations. Teachers may improve student performance on the day of the exam through
purposeful and permissible actions, such as reminding students of test-taking strategies or
making sure that all students understand exam instructions. Teachers might also take actions
which are not permissible, such as overtly (or covertly) supplying students with correct an-
swers. Instances of teacher cheating are well-documented (e.g., Jacob and Levitt (2003), New
York Times (2010)), and substitute teachers — who typically proctor exams in a teacher’s
absence — might have little incentive to engage in this type of malfeasance.31 Another
30The negative effect of make-up period absences in math but not English is somewhat puzzling. We
speculate that the result is driven from differences between the testing schedule information and the actual
dates students were tested in math. Over this period, New York City was permitted to test students within
a short window (usually 3 to 5 days) set forth by the state. If some math tests were administered after
the originally scheduled date, then a much larger fraction of students may have been tested during what we
classify as the make-up period. For example, we discovered that during the school year 2008-2009, extreme
winter weather caused the DOE to cancel classes on March 2, 2009 and postpone the start of 3rd, 4th, and
5th grade math exams (New York Times, March 3, 2009).
31To gauge whether cheating could explain our findings, we use results from Jacob and Levitt (2003),
who estimate that roughly 5 percent of teachers cheat and that cheating increases scores by 0.5 standard
deviations (10 additional standard score points on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills) on average. If the probability
of absence during the exam is independent of a teacher’s intention to cheat, we could expect a coefficient
of -0.025. This is larger than our estimate for English (-0.0128) but quite close to our estimate for math
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plausible explanation is that students perform worse on high-stakes tests when their reg-
ular teacher is absent because of increased anxiety or discomfort. A meta-analysis of two
dozen small-scale experimental studies on student familiarity with test examiners finds effect
sizes on the order of 0.3 standard deviations (Fuchs and Fuchs (1986)), and there are also
many studies demonstrating how anxiety in various forms can impact test performance (e.g.,
Steele and Aronson (1995)). Finally, a recent experiment by Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2011)
finds that students’ effort on tests can be very sensitive to small short-term incentives, and
it is possible that students exert less effort when the test is administered by a temporary
substitute.
Looking at absence frequency, we find some indication that teachers do not wish to be
absent on the day of the exam and shift work absences in order to do so; absence rates average
5.8% on days before exams, 5.3% on days after exams, 2.6% on days during the exam, and
8.5% on days during the make-up period. This also raises the possibility that a teacher’s
absence at so crucial a moment in the school year is a signal about her productivity on the
job. To address this issue, we look at teachers in grades 4 and 5, who provide instruction in
both subjects, and repeat our regressions while controlling for a student’s current score in
the other subject. In other words, we ask whether students score relatively worse in math (or
English) when a teacher is absent for the math (or English) exam. Our original findings are
quite robust to this much more stringent test, suggesting that, whatever the interpretation, a
teacher’s absence during high stakes exams has an important negative causal effect on exam
performance.
In addition to the effect teachers have on student performance on the day of the test,
it is often noted anecdotally that teachers engage in test preparation activities in the days
(-0.0244). However, if teachers who care enough about scores to risk cheating also care enough to show up at
work while ill, then teachers absent on the test day would be more honest than average, and these estimates
likely overstate the impact of cheating.
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and weeks prior to the exam. For example, they might focus on the material and types
of questions most likely to be on the exam. We investigate this by allowing for different
impacts of absences occurring 1-5 instructional days, 6-20 instructional days, and at least
21 instructional days prior to the exam. Though all absences have negative effects, we find
clear evidence that absences in the weeks and days leading up to exams have greater impacts
on exam performance than those occurring earlier in the year (Table 3.10, Columns 2 and
4). For math, the coefficient estimate for absences 21+ days prior is -0.00096 standard
deviations, similar to our baseline, but for absences 6-20 days and 1-5 days prior, the point
estimates are, respectively, double (-0.00185) and nine times (-0.0085) as large. The relative
magnitude of the coefficients in English are similar, suggesting that actions taken by regular
teachers just before exams are more important for exam performance than those taken earlier
in the year.32
3.4.4 Persistent Effects of Absence
It is natural to ask whether the impact of teacher absences on students’ test scores persists
into the following school year. Recent studies of teacher productivity have documented
that teachers’ effects on scores one year later are between 20 and 50 percent as large as
their effects on current test scores (Kane and Staiger (2008) and Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims
(2008)).33 Another motivation to examine persistence is the possibility that the outsized
effects of absences close to the exam period reflect “teaching to the test” or that the impact
32Allowing for separate coefficients for absences close to the exam does dampen the estimated effects of
absence during the exam period, but these coefficients (-0.0162 for math and -0.0081 for English) remain
quite large and statistically significant.
33The issue of “fade-out” has been raised for other educational interventions, though it may be caused
by differences in future resources or belie improvements in other outcomes (see Currie and Thomas (1995),
Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002), Chetty et al. (2010)). Lang (2010) makes the point that rescaling of
annual tests to have a mean of zero and standard deviation one could also lead to a perception that the
effects of educational interventions fade out.
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of absences during the exam reflect cheating or effects on the test taking environment, rather
than changes in students’ knowledge of the content being tested. If so, then we should see
lower persistence in the effects of absences that occur just prior to and during student exams.
Because we lack data on students in grade 9 or those that leave the school district, we
first show that our baseline results are similar when we drop all students in grade 8 and
students for whom we do not observe test scores the following year (Table 3.11, Columns
1 and 5). When we replace the current year’s exam with the following year’s exam as the
dependent variable, we find that the negative impact of absences prior to the exam exhibit a
similar level of fade-out as in previous studies (Columns 2 and 6). For math, the coefficient
on work days missed prior to exams in the following year is about 35 percent of the coefficient
in the current year; for English, the fade-out is similar, with following year effects roughly
45 percent of current effects. The coefficient on following year test scores is significant at
conventional levels in math and marginally significant in English (p-value 0.11).34
Importantly, the impact of absences during the exam period exhibits much greater fade-
out. The coefficient on following year math scores is only about 10 percent as large as the
coefficient on current year scores and is not statistically significant. In English, the coeffi-
cient on following year scores is positive, albeit not statistically significant. This suggests
that, whatever is driving the outsized effects of absence during the exam on current year
scores (e.g., cheating, test anxiety), it likely does not reflect real differences in student con-
tent knowledge. Also, it is worth noting that the coefficients on absences after exams, while
never statistically significant, suggest larger negative effects on following year test scores
than current year scores, in line with our causal interpretation.
34If a student does poorly in the current year, it may trigger policies in the following year designed to
remediate or improve their performance. In line with this idea, the coefficients grow slightly in magnitude
and are somewhat more precisely estimated when we control for future policies (i.e., grade retention, special
education, English language learner services, and assignment to a more experienced teacher). For example,
the English coefficient grows from -0.027 percent of a standard deviation to -0.028 and is significant at the
8 percent level.
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If we break out absences prior to exams by timing (i.e., more than 20 days prior, 6-20
days prior, and 1-5 days prior), we find suggestive evidence that the effects of absences closest
to the exams fade out most quickly. Most of the coefficients on following year scores are
between 25 and 65 percent of the magnitudes for current year scores. However, for math
scores, absences 1-5 days prior to the exam show an unusually large amount of fade-out,
with a coefficient in the following year that is only 6 percent of the current year coefficient
(Table 3.11, Column 4). This provides some indication, though far from conclusive, that a
significant portion of teachers engage in “test prep” activities just before an exam.
3.5 Conclusion
Worker absence is an important phenomenon across all countries, industries, and occupa-
tions. Among OECD nations, absence frequency is noticeably higher in northern Euro-
pean countries with generous national sick leave policies (e.g., Barmby, Ercolani, and Treble
(2002), Bergendorff (2003)). Absenteeism is also a major concern in developing countries,
particularly in the public sector where oversight may be very weak (Chaudhury et al. (2006)).
Despite its ubiquity, there is a paucity of empirical work which convincingly estimates
the causal impact of absenteeism on labor productivity. The major hurdle in this line of
research is addressing the endogeneity of work absence. To do so, we take advantage of
extremely detailed data on the absences of teachers in New York City public schools. We
present evidence that missed work days have an economically important negative impact on
productivity in teaching. To be confident that our estimates are causal, we focus on variation
within teachers over time and contrast the significant effects of absences occurring prior to
exams with the lack of any effect for absences occurring afterwards. We find similar impacts
of absences across different students and schools, but greater impacts for more experienced
(and productive) teachers than for newly hired teachers.
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Our estimates of daily productivity losses are smaller for longer spells of absence. This
pattern is likely caused by several factors: managers searching for more productive substi-
tutes on longer job assignments, more productive workers applying for longer job assign-
ments, or substitute workers becoming more productive on the job. We also find very large
negative effects of work absences just prior to and during student examinations, suggesting
that actions taken by the teacher at certain crucial moments in the school year have outsized
impacts on student exam performance. Finally, we find no evidence that teachers show up
to work when they are too ill to be productive (“presenteeism” in the parlance of social
psychologists), though an analysis based on direct observations of health and productivity
on-the-job would be better suited to addressing this issue.
Our study focuses on absenteeism in a significant part of the U.S. economy and one
which plays a key role in fostering growth (e.g., Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Hanushek
and Woessman (2008)). However, it is natural to ask how the impact of absenteeism in
education might generalize to other settings and which features of the educational process
may or may not be shared by other industries. First, labor substitution may be more difficult
in occupations like teaching that require skilled workers and involve personal relationships
with clients (e.g., healthcare practitioners, social workers, marketing and sales managers,
etc.). Second, employees may be more likely to be ill (and unproductive) while on the job
when paid sick leave is not available, and rates of paid sick leave are somewhat higher for
public school employees (90 percent) than for employees in private firms (70 percent).35
Third, the production schedule in education is somewhat inflexible (e.g., classes are not
be rescheduled) and losses from absenteeism cannot be addressed through overtime work
(Ehrenberg (1970)) or flexible hours.
35One problem with these statistics, taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee Benefits Survey,
is that the presence of paid sick leave may not accurately reflect the financial incentives for work attendance.
As we note above, teachers in New York City get paid when they are absent, but face financial costs because
they are paid for unused absences upon retirement.
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What can be done to limit the production losses from worker absenteeism? One possibility
is to address the root cause of absences, such as negative shocks to worker health. Indeed,
absence prevention is one of the main drivers of recent growth in employer sponsored “health
promotion” programs (Linnan et al. (2008)), though the evidence on the impact of these
programs on absenteeism is quite mixed (Aldana and Pronk (2001)).
Alternatively, governments and firms could offer stronger incentives for workers to show
up. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that financial incentives affect worker absence (e.g.,
Winkler (1980), Jacobson (1989), Ehrenberg et al. (1991), Barmby et al. (1991), Brown and
Sessions (1996), and Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2000)). However, only one study, a field
experiment in rural India (Duflo and Hanna (2005)), presents clear evidence that incentives
for workers to show up can raise productivity. Financial incentives for work attendance
could, in principle, decrease productivity by inducing workers to show up while seriously ill.
Though it is reasonable to think that workers would be less responsive to financial incentives
when in poor health, this is ultimately an empirical question.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Spells of Teacher Absence
Avg. Days Average Teacher-Year
Missed per Spell Observations with Total Spell
Teacher-Year Duration 1+Spells (%) Frequency
Total of All Types 9.98 1.56 96.9 622,843
Self-Treated Sickness 4.23 1.12 90.6 370,207
Medically Certified Sickness 2.02 2.39 41.2 82,482
Conference/School Activities 1.12 1.30 32.8 84,331
Medical Leave 0.54 42.78 1.3 1,241
Personal Days 0.47 1.32 26.3 34,476
Funeral/Death in Family 0.33 2.24 12.9 14,212
Jury Duty/Military Service 0.26 2.07 9.8 12,334
Maternity Leave 0.25 48.63 0.5 506
Child Care Leave 0.13 47.95 0.3 274
Injury 0.11 3.82 2.4 2,910
Resignation or Retirement 0.11 42.56 0.3 249
Religious Holiday 0.10 1.17 8.0 8,226
Graduation 0.10 1.36 4.0 7,217
Other Leave 0.06 44.82 0.1 134
Legislative Hearing 0.04 1.32 1.4 2,595
Grace Period 0.02 11.79 0.2 161
Personal Leave 0.02 25.56 0.1 75
Sick Family Member Leave 0.02 31.38 0.1 77
Death 0.01 37.67 0.0 15
Termination, Certification 0.01 34.15 0.0 33
Involuntary Termination 0.01 40.75 0.0 12
Unauthorized 0.01 1.55 0.4 741
Late More than Half Day 0.00 1.01 0.3 335
Note: Based on teachers in New York City teaching math and/or English to students in
grades 4-8 during the school years 1999-2000 to 2008-2009. Additional information on
sample restrictions is provided in the text.
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Table 3.2: Between and Within Variation in Teacher Absence
Math Teachers English Teachers
Total Absences
Mean 9.81 10.09
Standard Deviation 9.76 9.94
Within-Teacher S.D. 6.35 6.49
Absences Prior to Exam
Mean 6.50 5.07
Standard Deviation 7.12 6.34
Within-Teacher S.D. 4.68 4.10
Absences After Exam
Mean 2.78 4.58
Standard Deviation 4.91 6.76
Within-Teacher S.D. 3.39 4.62
Absences During Exam Period
Mean 0.05 0.05
Standard Deviation 0.31 0.28
Within-Teacher S.D. 0.22 0.21
Absences During Make-up Exam Period
Mean 0.47 0.39
Standard Deviation 1.00 0.90
Within-Teacher S.D. 0.71 0.65
Note: Based on teachers in New York City teaching math and/or English
to students in grades 4-8 during the school years 1999-2000 to 2008-2009.
The unit of observation is a teacher-grade-year; we create separate
observations for teachers of multiple grades in the same year because
exam dates differ across grades. Additional information on sample
restrictions is provided in the text.
104
Table 3.3: Absence from Work and Students’ Characteristics
Work Days Missed
Average Prior Math Test Score 0.9819+
(-1.9548)
Percent English Language Learner 0.9710
(-1.3235)
Percent Receiving Free Lunch 0.9625
(-1.4126)








Average Student Days Absent 1.0043*
(3.6761)
Note: This table presents coefficients from negative binomial regressions,
transformed into odds ratios. Lines separate the results of different
regressions within each column. All regressions have 97,540 teacher-year
observations. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5%
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Experience (Relative to Teachers with 7+ Years)
No Experience 0.7251*
(-20.7370)
1 Year of Experience 0.8769*
(-9.0892)
2 Years of Experience 0.9275*
(-5.2895)
3 Years of Experience 0.9686*
(-2.2772)
4 Years of Experience 0.9952
(-0.3369)
5 Years of Experience 1.0018
(0.1201)
6 Years of Experience 1.0015
(0.1032)
Males’ Age (Relative to Younger than 30)
Between 30 and 44 Years Old 0.9948
(-0.2768)
Between 45 and 54 Years Old 0.9626
(-1.4610)




Females’ Age (Relative to Younger than 30)
Female Between 30 and 44 Years Old 1.1330*
(6.2312)
Female Between 45 and 54 Years Old 0.9511+
(-1.9367)
Female Over 55 Years Old 0.9332*
(-2.2193)







Note: This table presents coefficients from negative binomial regressions,
transformed into odds ratios. Lines separate the results of different
regressions within each column. All regressions have 97,540 teacher-year
observations. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5%
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Table 3.5: Workday Absences and Productivity, Baseline Estimates and Placebo Test on Prior Year Score
Math Exam English Exam
Current Year Prior Year Current Year Prior Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Absences -0.169* -0.063*
(0.009) (0.008)
Absences Prior to Exam -0.201* -0.120* -0.021 -0.084* -0.061* -0.014
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.022)
Absences After Exam -0.035+ -0.013 -0.007 -0.018+ -0.008 -0.011
(0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018)
Teacher-School-Grade Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Dropped Controls Yes Yes
for Prior Scores
R-squared 0.664 0.664 0.702 0.454 0.611 0.611 0.636 0.428
Observations 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,363,619 2,363,619 2,363,619 2,363,619
Note: Coefficients are expressed in percentage points of a standard deviation. All specifications control for student
characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade characteristics, classroom characteristics, and grade-year fixed effects.
Specifications separating absences prior to and after exams also control for absences during the exam and make-up
exam period. Specifications without teacher-school-grade fixed effects also control for time-invariant teacher
characteristics. For more information, see the text. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school.
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5%
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Table 3.6: Absences of “Other Subject” Teachers in Middle School
Math Exam English Exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Teacher’s Absences Prior to Exam -0.190* -0.119* -0.001 0.001
(0.019) (0.024) (0.016) (0.018)
English Teacher’s Absences Prior to Exam -0.031* -0.007 -0.050* -0.031
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.025)
Math Teacher-School-Grade Fixed Effects No Yes No No
English Teacher-School-Grade Fixed Effects No No No Yes
R-squared 0.692 0.717 0.625 0.642
Number of Observations 1,199,002 1,199,002 1,095,078 1,095,078
Note: Coefficients are expressed in percentage points of a standard deviation. All
specifications are limited to students with different teachers for math and English.
Regressions include controls for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade
characteristics, classroom characteristics, grade-year fixed effects, and absences during
the exam and make-up exam periods and after the exam. Specifications without teacher-
school-grade fixed effects also control for time-invariant teacher characteristics. For
more information, see the text. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school.
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5%
Table 3.7: Effects of Absence and Work Experience
Math Exam English Exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Absences -0.120* -0.131* -0.061* -0.070*
Prior to Exam (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Teacher w/ < 3 Years ExperienceX 0.072* 0.048
Number of Absences Prior to Exam (0.033) (0.035)
R-squared 0.702 0.702 0.636 0.636
Number of Observations 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,363,619 2,363,619
Note: Coefficients are expressed in percentage points of a standard deviation. All
specifications control for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade
characteristics, classroom characteristics, grade-year fixed effects, teacher-school-grade
fixed effects, and absences during the exam and make-up exam period. For more
information, see the text. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school.
+significant at 10% *significant at 5%
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Table 3.8: Absence Duration (in Workdays) and Productivity Loss
Math Exam English Exam
(1) (2)
Absences Prior to Exam, 1 Day Spells -0.356* -0.173*
(0.045) (0.054)
Absences Prior to Exam, 2-3 Day Spells -0.290* -0.038
(0.049) (0.052)
Absences Prior to Exam, 4-5 Day Spells -0.222* -0.022
(0.058) (0.067)
Absences Prior to Exam, 6-10 Day Spells -0.171* -0.010
(0.053) (0.060)
Absences Prior to Exam, 11-30 Day Spells -0.075* -0.076*
(0.030) (0.037)




Note: Coefficients are expressed in percentage points of a standard deviation.
All specifications control for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade
characteristics, classroom characteristics, grade-year fixed effects, teacher-school-grade
fixed effects, and teacher absences during the exam and make-up exam period. For more
information, see the text. Absence spells are categorized by the number of consecutive
workdays missed (i.e., weekends, holidays, etc. are not counted). Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered by school. + significant at 10% * significant at 5%
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Table 3.9: Health vs. Non-Health Related Absences
Math Exam English Exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health Related Absences Prior to Exam -0.089* -0.057*
(0.015) (0.017)
Non-Health Related Absences Prior to Exam -0.190* -0.069*
(0.024) (0.025)
Absences Prior to Exam in 1 Day Spells
Health Related -0.442* -0.247+
(0.119) (0.142)
Non-Health Related -0.346* -0.167*
(0.047) (0.056)
Absences Prior to Exam in 2-3 Day Spells
Health Related -0.247* -0.097
(0.077) (0.098)
Non-Health Related -0.309* -0.007
(0.057) (0.061)
Absences Prior to Exam in 4-5 Day Spells
Health Related -0.289* -0.018
(0.078) (0.099)
Non-Health Related -0.151+ -0.020
(0.078) (0.097)
Absences Prior to Exam in 6-10 Day Spells
Health Related -0.161* 0.039
(0.069) (0.082)
Non-Health Related -0.178* -0.072
(0.083) (0.090)
Absences Prior to Exam in 11-30 Day Spells
Health Related -0.058+ -0.069+
(0.033) (0.040)
Non-Health Related -0.128+ -0.102
(0.069) (0.095)
Absences Prior to Exam in 31+ Day Spells
Health Related -0.076* -0.059*
(0.018) (0.022)
Non-Health Related -0.111* -0.055+
(0.037) (0.033)
R-squared 0.702 0.702 0.636 0.636
Observations 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,363,619 2,363,619
Note: Coefficients are expressed in percentage points of a standard deviation. All specifications
control for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade characteristics, classroom
characteristics, grade-year fixed effects, teacher-school-grade fixed effects, and teacher absences
during the exam and make-up exam period. For more information, see the text. Absence spells
are categorized by the number of consecutive workdays missed (i.e., weekends, holidays,
etc. are not counted). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school.
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5%
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Table 3.10: Absences and the Timing of Student Exams
Math Exam English Exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absences Prior to Exam -0.120* -0.061*
(0.013) (0.015)
Absences 21+ Workdays Prior to Exam -0.096* -0.030+
(0.015) (0.017)
Absences 6-20 Workdays Prior to Exam -0.185* -0.208*
(0.058) (0.061)
Absences 1-5 Workdays Prior to Exam -0.850* -0.398*
(0.144) (0.139)
Absences During Exam Period -2.440* -1.653* -1.283* -0.853*
(0.327) (0.351) (0.311) (0.329)
Absences During Make-up Exam Period -0.359* -0.274* 0.030 0.097
(0.101) (0.103) (0.099) (0.100)
Absences After Exam -0.013 -0.001 -0.008 -0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013)
R-squared 0.702 0.702 0.636 0.636
Observations 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,363,619 2363619
Note: Coefficients are expressed in percentage points of a standard deviation. All
specifications control for student characteristics, classroom characteristics, school-grade
characteristics, teacher experience, grade-year fixed effects, and teacher-school-grade
fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school. + significant at 10%
* significant at 5%
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Table 3.11: Persistence in the Effects of Workday Absences
Math Exam English Exam
Year t Year t+1 Year t Year t+1 Year t Year t+1 Year t Year t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of Absences Prior -0.106* -0.034* -0.062* -0.027
to Exam (Year t) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Absences 21+ Workdays -0.084* -0.029+ -0.037* -0.024
Prior to Exam (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Absences 6-20 Workdays -0.159* -0.075 -0.177* -0.040
Prior to Exam (0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.063)
Absences 1-5 Workdays -0.805* -0.046 -0.350* -0.116
Prior to Exam (0.161) (0.161) (0.160) (0.173)
Number of Absences -2.895* -0.319 -2.153* -0.253 -1.134* 0.540 -0.782* 0.613
During Exam (0.371) (0.342) (0.395) (0.374) (0.352) (0.373) (0.378) (0.394)
Number of Absences -0.317* -0.068 -0.222+ -0.058 0.031 0.022 0.091 0.035
During Make-Up Period (0.112) (0.113) (0.114) (0.115) (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
Number of Absences -0.009 -0.011 0.004 -0.010 0.005 -0.024 0.010 -0.023
After Exam (Year t) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
R-squared 0.699 0.653 0.699 0.653 0.644 0.594 0.644 0.596
Number of Observations 1,713,561 1,713,561 1,713,561 1,713,561 1,625,038 1,625,038 1,625,038 1,625,038
Note: Coefficients are expressed in percentage points of a standard deviation. Specifications are limited to students who are
not in the 8th grade and who have valid test scores in the following year. All specifications control for student characteristics,
teacher experience, school-grade characteristics, classroom characteristics, grade-year fixed effects, and teacher-school-grade
fixed effects. For more information, see the text. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school.
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5%
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Figure A.1: Top 20 Percent Calculations







.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Percent Rank
Notes: Schools received first round exemptions from implementing the standardized curriculum if their
score - the sum of the percents of students who passed the math and reading exams in 2002 - met or
exceeded the cutoff for their need category, or if their score was within 10 points of the cutoff for their need
category and they were in the top 20 percent of improvement citywide in the previous year. I calculated
schools ranks in improvement as follows: For 4th-8th grade students, I calculated each students gain for
each subject as the difference between her raw scaled test scores in that subject in 2002 and 2001. For 3rd
grade students, I calculated each students gain for each subject as the difference between her raw scaled
test score in that subject in 2002 and the schools average raw scaled test score for 3rd graders in that
subject in 2001. I then summed the schools average gain in math and reading and ranked schools by these
gains. Note that reading test scores for 7th graders in 2002 are missing due to an issue with the exam.
Since I only had test data for 3rd through 8th graders, I could only calculate ranks for elementary and
middle schools. Thus, I use data from the first round exemptions to determine the rank cutoff that would
place an elementary or middle school among the top 20 percent of all city schools (including high schools).
Note that among schools within 10 points of the cutoff for their need category, only those that placed in
the top 20 percent citywide should have received an exemption. The figure plots the probability of
receiving a first round exemption on schools ranks in improvement (calculated by the author) for only
schools with scores within 10 points of the normal cutoff for their need group. I set the break point for the
top 20 percent at 0.68, the rank that maximizes the goodness-of-fit from a model of exemption receipt as a
function of an indicator equal to one if the schools rank is above a particular threshold, the same procedure
used in Chay et al. (2005).
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Figure A.2: Cross-Validation Functions
Math



























































































10 20 30 40 50 60
Bandwidth
























































































10 20 30 40 50 60
Bandwidth
Standardized Curricula Math Test Score
Reading
























































































10 20 30 40 50 60
Bandwidth

















































































10 20 30 40 50 60
Bandwidth
Standardized Curricula Reading Test Score
Notes: These panels present cross-validation functions for each outcome and side using the “leave
one out” procedure described in Lee and Lemieux (2010). More details can be found in Appendix
Table A2.
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Figure A.3: Previous Math and Reading Programs
Math
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Notes: Figures plot the residuals from regressions of the dependent variables reporting any program or reporting standardized curricula
programs on cutoff fixed effects as well as the fitted values from locally weighted regressions of these residuals on schools rescaled scores.
These data come from optional sections of schools 2002 report cards. Report cards were filled out in 2003, after the announcement of the
standardized curricula but before they were required to be implemented.
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Table A.1: Curricular Materials, Publishers, and Minimum Time Limits
Program Publisher Grades
Math
Everyday Mathematics SRA/McGraw-Hill K-5
Math Steps* Houghton-Mifflin K-5
Impact Mathematics Glencoe/McGraw-Hill 6-8
Hot Words, Hot Topics* Glencoe/McGraw-Hill 6-8
New York Math A: An Integrated Approach Prentice Hall 9-12
Reading
Month-by-Month Phonics Carson-Dellosa K-3
Voyager Passport* Voyager Expanded Learning K-3
Ramp-Up to Literacy* America’s Choice 6,9








1.5 hours/day for struggling students 9-12
Note: * Signifies supplementary materials
Table A.2: Cross-validated Bandwidths
Left Side Right Side
Standardized Math Curricula 41 39
Math Test Scores 44 41
Standardized Reading Curricula 22 37
Reading Test Scores 36 23
Note: Cross-validated bandwidths are calculated using the ”leave one out” procedure
described in Lee and Lemieux (2010); for observations to the left (right) of the cutoff,
for each observation i, a predicted outcome is obtained from a regression of the
outcome using only observations to the left (right) of observation i within the bandwidth
on cutoff fixed effects and the distance from the cutoff. The cross-validation function
for the bandwidth is defined as the sum of the squared differences between the
outcome for observation i and the predicted outcome from the regression using this
bandwidth, divided by the number of observations. The cross-validation choice is the
bandwidth that minimizes the cross-validation function. Lee and Lemieux advise
choosing (i) the minimum cross-validated bandwidths, (ii) a bandwidth that minimizes
the weighted average of the cross-validation function (to obtain a symmetric bandwidth),
or (iii) a bandwidths that correspond to the outcome. I chose the minimum bandwidth
between the standardized curriculum and the outcome and use this on both sides.
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Table A.3: Previous Math and Reading Programs in 2003
Math Percent Reading Percent
Listing Math Programs on Report Card 11% Listing Reading Programs on Report Card 41%
Conditional on Listing, % Listing ... Conditional on Listing, % Listing ...
Everyday Math 34% Balanced Literacy 50%
Math A 23% Project Read 34%
TERC/Investigations 19% Reading Recovery 21%
Math In Context 11% Success for All 6%
Everyday Counts 5% AUSSIE 5%
Larsen’s Math 3% Breakthrough to Literacy 5%
Scott Foresman 1% Teacher’s College Reading and Writing Project 3%
Math Steps 3% Voyager 3%
Math Their Way 3% Making Connections 2%
Comprehensive Instructional
Management System 2% Mondo/Building Essential Literacy 2%
Basic Skills Math 1% Strategies for Success in Literacy 2%
Math Trailblazers 1% CUNY Literacy 1%
Guided Reading 1%
Note: Math and reading programs, including supplementary programs, which were listed on the 2002 report cards of schools
in the analysis. Reporting of programs was optional, and percentages may add up to more than 100 since schools could list
multiple programs. These data come from the following sections of the school report cards: Special Academic Programs,
Extracurricular Activities, Community Support, and Parent/School Support. The 2002 report cards were completed in 2003
after the announcement of the standardized curricula but before they were required to be implemented.
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Appendix B
Worker Absence and Productivity
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Table B.1: New York City Math and English Testing Dates, 2000-2009
English Exams
School Year Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
1999-2000 2/1-2/3/2000 4/12/00 4/12/00 4/12/00 5/16-5/17/2000
2000-2001 1/29-2/2/2001 4/19/01 4/19/01 4/19/01 5/8-5/9/2001
2001-2002 1/29-1/31/2002 4/16/02 4/16/02 4/16/02 3/5-3/6/2002
2002-2003 2/4-2/6/2003 4/15/03 4/15/03 4/15/03 1/14-1/15/2003
2003-2004 2/3-2/5/2004 4/20/04 4/20/04 4/20/04 1/13-1/14/2004
2004-2005 2/1-2/3/2005 4/12/05 4/12/05 4/12/05 1/11-1/13/2005
2005-2006 1/10-1/12/2006 1/17-1/18/2006 1/17-1/19/2006 1/17-1/18/2006 1/17-1/18/2006
2006-2007 1/9-1/11/2007 1/16-1/17/2007 1/16-1/18/2007 1/16-1/17/2007 1/16-1/17/2007
2007-2008 1/8-1/10/2008 1/8-1/9/2008 1/15-1/17/2008 1/15-1/16/2008 1/15-1/16/2008
2008-2009 1/13-1/15/2009 1/13-1/14/2009 1/21-1/23/2009 1/21-1/22/2009 1/21-1/22/2009
Math Exams
School Year Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
1999-2000 5/17-5/19/2000 5/4/00 5/4/00 5/4/00 5/18-5/19/2000
2000-2001 5/6-5/8/2001 4/25/01 4/25/01 4/25/01 5/15-5/16/2001
2001-2002 5/7-5/9/2002 4/23/02 4/23/02 4/23/02 5/7-5/8/2002
2002-2003 5/6-5/8/2003 4/30/03 4/30/03 4/30/03 5/6-5/7/2003
2003-2004 5/4-5/6/2004 4/27/04 4/27/04 4/27/04 5/4-5/5/2004
2004-2005 5/10-5/12/2005 4/19/05 4/19/05 4/19/05 5/10-5/11/2005
2005-2006 3/7-3/9/2006 3/7-3/8/2006 3/14-3/15/2006 3/14-3/15/2006 3/14-3/15/2006
2006-2007 3/6-3/8/2007 3/6-3/7/2007 3/13-3/14/2007 3/13-3/14/2007 3/13-3/14/2007
2007-2008 3/4-3/6/2008 3/4-3/5/2008 3/10-3/11/2008 3/10-3/11/2008 3/10-3/11/2008
2008-2009 3/4-3/6/2009 3/4-3/5/2009 3/10-3/11/2009 3/10-3/11/2009 3/10-3/11/2009
